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31 August 1982

NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

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MORE RECRUITMENT OF GUARDS FROM THAILAND REPORTED

Bangkok SIAM RAT SAPPADA WICHAN in Thai 6 Jun 82 pp 7, 8

[Article: "Mercenaries (for Iraq), Another Step in Thai Labor"]

[Text] While Thai workers are meeting their fates, having been deceived into going to work in the Middle East, the policy at high levels of government has not been resolved. News has spread that people are being hired to fight in Iraq. Thai workers are becoming victims of the desire for personal gain, which would cost them their lives.

Activities Revealed

Sargeant Major Songthan Panyadi, MP for Chiangrai, revealed that influential firms and their comrades in commercial operations in Chiangrai Province have announced they are seeking applicants to become mercenaries in Iraq. Those who apply must have proof that they are soldiers in the reserves and must pay an application fee of 50 baht. The firm will pay an advance of 60,000 baht per person and 10,000 baht monthly salary. If the person dies, they will pay his family 100,000 baht.

"Some people asked me if they are really going to fight or if it's a trap, because the firm is seeking 300 applicants," Sargeant Major Songtham said.

When he learned of this the MP from Chiangrai got in touch with Lieutenant General Thurayut Thumanon, head of the war veterans' settlement of Chiangrai, but the latter said, "Veterans are not involved."

Mr Chirayut Khunaphon, Chiangrai Provincial Labor, said concerning this that several applicants came to discuss becoming mercenaries for Iraq without having to pay a go-between, and with applicants receiving a large sum of money before leaving; but when the firm was questioned, they denied they sent people to fight and said that they sent workers with the permission of the Labor Department, Chiangrai Registration 1/2521.

"So the police became interested in investigating. They maintain that there was a promise to send a quota of 200 men to be guards of oil storehouses and airfields," Chiangrai Provincial Labor reports.

The Announcement

The report stated that rumors of people being sought to be mercenaries for Iraq have been circulating for 2-3 months, but there has been no firm evidence, although the activities of enlisting applicants merit suspicion. For example, some places have accepted applicants who have been in the military and are under 35 with remuneration similar to that reported.

One worker now staying at the Mitari Hotel who is waiting to go do construction work in South Africa, revealed that "some people claim that officers have contacted them about fighting in Iraq, but not my group."

Also, there is one firm that finds people to work as security guards by a backdoor method, sending a go-between to arrange for work in Iraq for those aged 26-36, with the agreement of the embassy and a monthly salary of 10,000 baht, an advance of 50,000 baht and 100,000 baht upon death.

"Two or three of my workers agreed to go. They were supposed to leave within 2 days, but after the news came out, their departure was probably delayed."

The tactics of a security protection firm to persuade workers are used because of the qualifications of such workers, who must have been in the military previously.

Announcement of Acceptance of Applications

According to the announcement, though one probably won't find written evidence, on 16 May the Thoemsak Solar Energy Company at 425 Phailom precinct in the district capital, Det-udom Street, Nakhonrachasima province, announced it was sending people to work in Iraq.

The substance of the letter to prospective applicants was: "It is because Iraq needs Thai workers who have been in the military and are now in the reserves without any obligation to the government or the military, who are willing to go become guards at government buildings in Iraq."

These are the details: There is a 2-year contract. There is 1 month of vacation for 11 months of work. The salary is 10,000 baht per month and may increase when appropriate. There is no overtime. There is an 8-hour work-day. We are to be guards for the Iraqi Government. After we go we receive at least 7 days of training. There is no fee at all. Iraq will reimburse us for passports, but we (the workers) must pay for them first. And, those interested may contact the representative at the Iraqi embassy, Captain Toemsak Changlo. At the end of the letter of invitation, he repeats: "No fee is required at all," and signs it "information officer for policies of the Iraqi Embassy."

From a quick look at the details of the above job announcement, it may be just a request for Thais to go work as security guards, but the fact that no fee is asked fits in with the activity of hiring people to fight in Iraq.

Mr. Pahithun Chantharachampi, Labor, Nakhonrachasima province, revealed to SAPPADA WICHAN that "I am following these activities also. I have sent officials to keep a steady watch. We have tried asking workers but have not gotten any details. Right now we are calling on the news media in Khorat. TV Channel 5 in Khonkaen is helping to spread the news that it isn't true about hiring people to fight, because otherwise people would keep pouring into Khorat every day."

Today (1 June) two pickup trucks came from Khonkaen bringing in applicants, according to reports," said Nakhonrachasima Labor. "Now I am getting in touch with the district chief to call for a meeting of precinct heads and village heads to help point out the truth."

Mr Thoemsak's firm did not receive permission from the Labor Department to arrange for work, and Provincial Labor says they cannot proceed legally because there has not yet been a complaint.

"Yes. Our firm sends people to the Middle East," an official in the office of Captain Thoemsak replied curtly, and he said, "Mr Thoemsak is not in. He is in Bangkok."

Iraqi Embassy Denial

A news report from the Ministry of the Interior revealed that high level officials of the Labor Department met with representatives of the Iraqi Embassy, who denied that Thais were hired to fight in Iraq.

However, the AP reported that 20-30,000 Egyptian enlistees have already gone to fight in Iraq and that Iraq has asked Egypt to send soldiers to fight but hasn't received an answer.

Mr Prasat Maensuwan, head of the news bureau of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, told SAPPADA WICHAN that "there has not yet been an official letter of denial from the Iraqi Embassy."

"As for those who are going to Iraq now, we have no way of investigating except through the Iraqi Embassy," Mr Prasat said.

Victims of Personal Gain

News reports say that the Department of Labor sent a letter to the director of the Police Department requesting that they join together in following the matter closely. After the news of sending Thais to be mercenaries spread, Mr Charoen Siriphan, Deputy Director of the Labor Department, said that he had heard about it. So the Labor Department sent officials to join police officials in seeking the truth. They asked the special war center's Pawai paratroopers, Lopburi Province, whether or not Thais have been trained to fight in Iraq, but they denied being involved in the matter.

"Any firm that sends workers to fight must go through legal discussions, because it is against legal stipulations," Deputy Director of the Labor Department said.

"I still don't know of this. I have not received a report," General Sitti Chirarot, minister of the interior, said, shaking his head. "If I were the Thais, I wouldn't do this, because it does not involve the use of manpower."

In any case, from these reports it can be concluded that people are seeking personal gain by sending workers to be mercenaries in Iraq, with workers staking their lives on the great compensation. The government should reveal the truth and find a way to suppress these people completely, because underhandedness is not beneficial, especially to international friendships.

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CSO: 4207/111

IDF MODIFIES EQUIPMENT SOLD ABROAD

Tel Aviv BAMAHAANE in Hebrew 2 Jun 82 pp 6, 8

[Interview with Brigadier General Zvi Amid, chief signal and electronic officer by BAMAHAANE: "IDF Improves and Modifies for its Needs the Products that the Industry in Israel Supplies to Foreign Countries; Many Terrorist Groups have been Captured by Radar, a Discovery of the Signal Corps"; date and place not specified]

[Text] The signal and electronic corps of the IDF is equal and is often better than similar corps in the Western world. The close ties that have been established between the corps and the electronics industry in Israel enables the IDF to equip itself with equipment which came before that of their counterparts in the world and turned the Israeli industry into one of the most advanced and profitable in the world--so says Brigadier General Zvi Amid, chief signal and electronics officer, in an interview with BAMAHAANE. In the interview he reveals that the IDF improves and modifies the equipment supplied by the Israeli industry so that its equipment is better and more advanced than that which is being sold by Israel to different countries in the world.

The chief signal and electronics officer tells in the interview about the anticipated changes in the signal corps in the 1990's and about the role of the corps in the future battlefield. He analyzes the struggle with problems of electronic warfare and encoding of information and explains the ramifications of the IDF evacuation from Sinai from the vantage point of the signal corps.

[Question] Brigadier General Amid, the signal corps, like all the other corps, finds itself in a difficult position with the final evacuation from Sinai and the new Sinai borders: What are the main problems lying in wait as a result of the evacuation? What will the main difficulty be if and when another war broke out in the south?

[Answer] The main problem stems from signal ranges that could be created if we had to enter Sinai again. If during the Yom Kippur War we were relatively close to the main battle areas, now we would be forced to establish communications to the battle ground from distant areas at the international border.

[Question] How do you overcome it?

[Answer] By creating a more complicated system which requires many more resources and higher skills. In the past we used mobile forces which were prepared for action during quiet periods; but today we will have to bring this formation to the field and establish it very quickly during battle. Mobile forces cost a lot of money and require a lot of highly skilled manpower to activate and establish.

[Question] This says then that the signal corps is actually undergoing a certain revolution in its manpower? Are there changes in emphasis, in courses, and in training?

[Answer] No, if there are drastic changes, it won't be because of the evacuation from Sinai. There will be changes in the emphasis, but there will not be a revolution--not in the quality and not in the professional makeup of manpower. In completely different areas relating to communication needs and control systems on the battlefield, we already are in the forefront of a kind of revolution--that is, in a transition to a communication technology of the 1990's. The entry to such technology requires the training of professionals in areas other than those we have been engaged in in the past. This transition will also require retraining of the reserve forces in the new fields.

[Question] Does this pretend a different signal corps than we knew? Do the changes you speak about pertain to all ranks--beginning with the highest tactical level to the operating soldier in the field?

[Answer] If one speaks about the ordinary soldier, the changes will be as follows: lighter equipment, smaller and with higher flexibility of operation. The character of the new technology makes it possible for it to be implemented at the lowest rank, but here budgetary considerations come into play. There is no sense in supplying the individual soldier with the newest technology with all of its advantages because he has no need for it. The main changes therefore will be felt at the higher ranks. At the tactical levels, appropriate electronic responses could be found, the operation of new weaponry and more.

[Question] How will you really deal with these problems of coding, concealing and electronic warfare?

[Answer] The digital numeral technology makes it possible to conduct electronic warfare and to hide the transmissions by means that were unavailable in the previous technology. After we optimized all we could from the analogical technology, we started a new route with digital communication and we have an answer to electronic warfare. But we have to remember that there is no escape from the cycle of creating counter means and the "struggle" in this area has just begun.

[Question] Brigadier General Amid, the signal corps has strong ties to the Israeli electronics industry. This is a commercial industry guided by

commercial considerations and which as much as is known to me, uses the name of the IDF to enhance its overseas sales. How do you view the reciprocity in the relationship between you and that industry?

[Answer] The actual development of the electronics industry in Israel and not only in military products, is due thanks to that strong tie with the IDF in general and the signal corps in particular. This tie is very strong and it is enough to remember one significant fact: almost all of the engineers and developers of these companies serve in the reserves in our corps. The needs of the IDF and the ability of our industry created a cycle of quick and reliable development throughout the years which puts the products at the highest standards in the world. This tie with Israeli industry makes it possible for us not to be dependent on outside sources, and indeed, 90 percent of the electronic and commercial equipment in the IDF is produced in Israel. On the other hand, one should not overlook the fact that this contributes to Israeli industry, which benefits from the good reputation and operational experience of the IDF. There is the danger of revealing IDF secrets, but because of that there are clearly written agreements between the IDF and industry, and as much as I know, these agreements are strictly observed. By the way, one should not forget that more than once the IDF has ordered equipment from a certain company, and then introduced improvements and modified it to specific requirements so that IDF equipment is often better and more advanced than that which was sold to other nations in the world.

[Question] Many publications, especially in the U.S., have determined that in the next war the signal corps importance will be considerably greater and will put it at the top of the ladder. You are probably in agreement with this assumption but maybe you could also explain it?

[Answer] The picture of the battlefield in the 1990's reveals lethal weapons which will require deployment of forces in the field but also their quick concentration at the point where one wants to subdue the enemy. This doctrine can only be executed through a reliable communications system. A commander who cannot concentrate his forces, control them and transmit up-to-the minute data to them to operate his sophisticated weapons--will lose the war. In WWII, it was possible to transmit information with a runner--today such a possibility does not exist--events that once were measured in days and hours, today are measured in minutes and seconds.

[Question] Brigadier General Amid, the armor corps is afraid of the anti-tank and the air force of the anti-aircraft. What are you afraid of?

[Answer] Our problems will be in two areas. The first--electronic warfare, but not only in the area of enemy disruption but also because of our electronic beaming devices. The second problem--the murderous tempo, the mobility and the need to create a communications apparatus in a short period of time.

[Question] From future wars we should move for a moment to the problems of the present. A year ago the signal corps revealed a radar device to detect

people. What is the role of this radar in the daily security system and in capturing terrorist groups along the borders of Israel?

[Answer] Many groups, including famous ones, were captured by means of this radar. Were you to have visited my unit, you would have seen that there is no more room on the walls because of the many champagne bottles, with each signifying the successful capture of a terrorist group.

9944

CSO: 4423/181

INTELLIGENCE CORPS TO OPEN SECOND SCHOOL

Tel Aviv BAMAHAHE in Hebrew 2 Jun 82 p 7

[Article by Yanon Shanker: "First Publication on the Occasion of Intelligence Corps Day"]

[Text] In Jerusalem there is a school for the study of Intelligence.

The Intelligence Corps will soon open a second pre-army school for the study of intelligence systems, the Arabic language, and radio operation. Today there already is such a school in Jerusalem where many students study. These schools are the only ones of this kind in the world.

The new pre-army school which will open in the coming academic year was established next to the military boarding school in Haifa with the assistance of the head of the training department and the boarding school commander and in cooperation with the municipality of Haifa. The first graduating class will include students who are being localized these days. These are young boys and girls from regular high schools who are defined as "in need of special assistance and encouragement." They are being referred to the schools of Intelligence Corps by the administration of the high school.

In Jerusalem an additional graduating class will finish its studies this summer in the Intelligence Corps school. The studies in that school are the same as in any other school; the student acquires, besides the high school education, knowledge in the Intelligence system, the Arabic language, wireless radio and in other intelligence subjects.

At the end of their studies the school's graduates receive a diploma for completing 12 years of study in the vocational track of intelligence subjects, which is unique in the world. The graduates can take all the matriculation exams. Upon their recruitment they are integrated into the armed forces intelligence system and upon their release their diploma grants them preference for acceptance by civilian and defense institutions that are in need of Arabists.

Soon another such school will be established in the Tel Aviv area. The pre-army schools of the Intelligence Corps are one of the ways to encourage students to study the Arabic language and to become integrated in the corps. The Intelligence Corps attaches great importance to the operation of these schools--as a solution to weak students in the high schools and as necessary manpower for the corps.

CSO: 4423/181

BETTER CONTROL OF ARMS EXPORTS PROPOSED

Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew 3 Jun 82 p 11

[Article by Moshe Carmel: "Arms Export: Guiding Principles"]

[Text] Several unfortunate episodes of publications regarding the sale of Israeli arms to different countries around the world--publications the veracity of which the average Israeli citizen could not possibly ascertain--have not contributed to the positive image of the State of Israel in the world. Therefore, whoever is concerned with Israel's good reputation internationally, cannot remain indifferent to the matter.

The Israeli arms industry has developed substantially throughout the years and is serving increasingly the independent security needs of the country, for which it has been mainly designated. It also serves as an exporter to other countries. The proportion of defense production as part of total industrial exports is considerable and contributes significantly to the balance of payments of the nation. These exports have already surpassed the \$1 billion mark and are close to one-quarter of the total of all Israeli industrial exports.

It seems that what is even more important than this is that exports of defense products which increase constantly, with their notable income, help considerably in research and development and in enlarging independent production for defense purposes. This narrows our dependence on outside factors in the vital area of the country's security and defense and strengthens our internal vigor.

However, one should not forget that the sale of arms to other countries was and is a very sensitive problem which requires a very cautious policy and great strictness in its application, always linked to basic principles that should not be deviated from.

There is a universal assumption that the arms trade throughout the world, which usually takes place in secret, involves vile and unscrupulous tactics in the sense that all is permitted for the sake of money. There are some international arms merchants who do not refrain from supplying arms to dictatorial regimes, countries at war and murderous terrorist organizations, without ever checking their destination.

Representatives of repressive, fanatic and racist regimes in various parts of the world cross the globe in search of arms for their shady purposes; and there are always shrewd arms merchants who supply their needs for good money in various indirect ways. Often they supply arms at the same time to both warring parties.

Israel has always conducted arms sales to foreign countries with strict discretion and great caution, while being committed to basic policy principles and to an international viewpoint of peace, security and stability in the relationships between nations, that should be undermined by supplying arms to any party that can sabotage it.

I myself can testify that in the governments which I participated, no arms deal was concluded with a foreign party without it being brought up in detail before the entire government, which then carefully checked it and approved it.

Members of the government demonstrated great sensitivity concerning the destination of the defense exports and more than once they rejected a proposal for such a deal because of the character of the regime of the purchaser, as a result of suspicion of harmful intentions in the use of the arms, or because of fear of involvement in hostilities which do not concern us, whether it be between nations in an armed conflict or in an internal civil war in any country; even if this could economically damage the arms industry and overall industrial exports. Economic considerations cannot be the only or primary ones in these decisions.

Because of the suspicions that circulate around the world in such matters, there are those who are quick to relate clandestine policy, unlimited expediency and a lack of moral considerations to any arms sale; because of all of this it is incumbent to act with special caution to ensure that Israel's activities in the area of arms exports will remain based on steadfast ideological and political principles--and will also be seen as such in the world.

In the situation that has been now created, it will be appropriate for a specially authorized committee on behalf of the foreign and defense committee of the Knesset to think about this important problem, to check anew the principles and criteria of arms sales to foreigners which should serve as a guide for the government in its treatment of this sensitive subject.

9944

CSO: 4423/181

NEW PHOSPHATE DEPOSITS

Tel Aviv YOMAN HASHAVU'A in Hebrew 2 Jun 82 p 18

[Article by Ariel Cohen: "Will the Phosphates Save the Country's Economy in the Future"]

[Text] Israel, to our regret, is not abundant with raw materials, we do not have basic or precious metals. The only metal that is found in the country is copper in the Timna mines but the low price of this metal prevents any economic activity in the Timna mines in the southern Negev.

Indeed, Israel does not have metallic raw materials, but is blessed with another raw material--phosphates, which is a material very much in demand in world markets. Phosphates, which are found in abundance in the deserts of the Negev, serve as a fertilizing material. In the ever-increasing world population, this substance, which enriches agricultural land, has great significance.

In recent years Israeli phosphate exports have increased substantially and annual exports have amounted to 2 million tons with a monetary value of 90 million dollars.

The economic and geographical institutions in the state of Israel are well aware of the importance of phosphates as a source of dollar earnings. Recently a comprehensive survey was conducted, headed by Yair Shiloni from the Geological Institute, great deposits were discovered, which will enable the doubling of phosphate exports from Israel. These discoveries open new horizons for "The Israel Chemical Company," which extracts the phosphate deposits in the country.

If the government will decide to invest in increasing the extraction of phosphates in Israel, there will be a need for the investment of millions of dollars in new installations and in developing new systems in order to provide an optimal extraction of phosphate deposits. It is possible that in the distant future the agricultural problems in the world will confer the same importance upon phosphates that oil possesses today and then Israel too could establish a Phosphate OPEC. What is interesting is that in such an OPEC the other great phosphate producers in the world, Jordan and Morocco, will also participate.

9944

CSO: 4423/181

PRESIDENTIAL CRISIS EXAMINED

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic No 284, 31 Jul 82 pp 19-20

[Article by Ghassan Bayram: "Waiting for the Password: Occupation, Siege, Constitutional Interval and a Single Candidate for the Presidency"]

[Text] Lebanon's Chamber of Deputies which has been almost absent for the past 7 years will make a decisive statement when it elects a new president.

The constitutional interval began, but the Israeli occupation recognizes no intervals and no laws.

Last 23 July marked the beginning of the constitutional interval during which a president must be elected. Despite the attention that had been previously devoted to this matter, all political forces became embroiled in this campaign when this constitutional interval began. This campaign for the presidency is being fought under the most difficult and the most serious critical stages that Lebanon has experienced.

On the first day of that interval the speaker of Parliament, Kamil al-As'ad, began deliberations with the various parliamentary blocs. These deliberations dealt with setting a date for electing a president in view of the fact that serious warnings continued to be heard, threatening that the constitutional interval may come to an end before a president can be elected. One of the groups in the struggle may delay the [parliamentary] session or prevent it altogether by military means. That is, parliament or any other place where that session might be held would become a target for [that group's] artillery to prevent deputies from getting to the meeting. The other possibility that may delay the election process is the lack of agreement or accord in Lebanon over who the new president should be.

A few days before the constitutional interval began, official and political Lebanese agencies conducted a poll to find out what the opinions of various Lebanese forces were. The two following questions were asked:

This was the first: In case the Israeli occupation continues and West Beirut remains surrounded and no political solution for the presence of Palestinians in West Beirut is found, do you think it is possible under those circumstances that the Chamber of Deputies can meet to elect a new president?

This was the second question: In your opinion, if these conditions persist, who can become a presidential candidate? Can al-Shaykh Bashir al-Jumayyil become a candidate? Or are there Arab and Lebanese considerations that will ultimately play their part and prevent him from achieving the seat of the presidency, thereby making the election of another strong candidate who would bring about national accord possible?

This Lebanese agency [sic] that conducted this poll with activist political and parliamentary forces received different answers to these questions. Some of them thought it would be difficult to ensure that the session would be convened and that a new president elected. Others thought the opposite. Some had reservations and thought that this matter ultimately depended on new developments that would emerge on the scene from now until the date of the meeting for holding the election. However, the common denominator for all these responses was this: the election of a new president was imperative. There was also this question: Does the United States ultimately want a new president [for Lebanon] or not? It is this that will indicate how credible the U.S. position is.

Declared U.S. positions, as has been known from the outset, have persistently affirmed the need for electing a new president. In this context, U.S. Presidential Envoy Philip Habib took action on numerous levels. Nevertheless, people continued to be wary of the U.S. position, and their wariness was justified. Ever since Philip Habib began visiting Lebanon, he has been affirming that the [presidential] election would take place on the date set for it in the constitution. He has been affirming that it would take place in a normal, democratic atmosphere without pressure and terror. When Israel invaded Lebanon and when its army surrounded West Beirut, Philip Habib gave officials and politicians the same assurances. He assured them that the [presidential] election would take place after Israel withdraws from Lebanon and after the problem of Palestinian presence is solved. However, Lebanese confidence in these U.S. assurances and affirmations began to fade when the constitutional interval came upon Lebanon and the situation was unchanged. In fact, it had become worse. Israel and its occupation [forces] were still in Lebanon: Israel was reinforcing its military positions; it was tightening its blockade on the Palestinians in the western section of Beirut; and it was threatening to invade West Beirut. There were no prospects for any political solutions that would do away with this situation. Hence, numerous questions have emerged about the outcome of U.S. assurances. There were numerous questions also about how, where and on what basis a new president can be elected.

As these numerous warnings persisted, the speaker of parliament aimed his deliberations at emphasizing the need for setting the date of the presidential election as soon as possible. If necessary, that date should be before mid August. All the parliamentary blocs which the speaker consulted tended to agree with him that urgent national needs required that a president be elected. However, opinions expressed by these blocs were divided about the fact that the meeting at which the election was to take place may not be held.

The political group for whom the nomination of Bashir al-Jumayyil is not a sensitive issue and which does not have feelings of defeat because of his candidacy went beyond that consideration and focused its discussion with the speaker on security considerations. How can a president be elected while Beirut was still under siege? What was the guarantee that parliament would meet and that no one would delay that meeting by artillery shells? What will be the outcome if

violent fighting breaks out on the day of the election? Although this political group took this security factor into consideration, the other political group, a majority of which is represented by some Islamic leaders and by the National Movement, asked how a president can be elected in a situation where no one was able to declare himself a candidate but al-Shaykh Bashir al-Jumayyil, and no one but al-Shaykh Bashir was able to begin the process of action on a broad scale to ensure the parliamentary majority that would guarantee his election!

Speaker Kamil al-As'ad admitted to various groups that these dangers existed, but he emphasized on the other hand that it was his national duty to set a date as soon as possible for the election of a new president, as long as the situation remains critical, and as long as the present existing equation states that electing a president signifies that Lebanon, its national and international legitimacy and its existing borders will survive. It is not so much that not electing a president would threaten to create a constitutional vacuum and the [perilous] conditions that may ensue from such a decision, but it would also threaten the destiny of Lebanon as a state, an entity and a country. In his deliberations with the deputies Speaker al-As'ad said, "If the constitutional interval comes to an end and a legitimate president is not elected under any condition whatsoever, who would guarantee that each group would not elect the president it wants? We would then have a republic with two or several presidents, and this would legitimize all these illegitimate forces. Then, some countries will recognize one president, and other countries will recognize another. We would thus have succumbed to the danger that will firmly establish and legitimize the existing division on the land and among the people." On the basis of these assumptions, as Speaker al-As'ad sees them, he also thinks that the dangers and perils of not electing a president remain greater and much more serious than current ones which urge anticipating [all this] and setting an election date.

Some deputies tried to persuade Speaker al-As'ad to bide his time now and to wait until 13 September, which is the date when the Chamber of Deputies has to meet to elect a president. On that date parliament does not have to be summoned to a meeting by the speaker. [This effort that was being made to persuade the speaker] was made in the hope that new developments would have changed the political and military reality that has existed by virtue of the Israeli occupation. These new developments may provide an opportunity for another candidate to emerge on the scene, and the matter would not be confined to one candidate who is al-Shaykh Bashir al-Jumayyil.

However, Speaker al-As'ad affirmed that he was determined to convene parliament as soon as possible. He asked this group of deputies, "Can one count on developments that may not take place? If these developments do not take place, what would happen when we come to the end of the constitutional interval and the situation is worse than it is now? Do we give up and leave the country without a legal president? Is the alternative [to that] to form a transitional government that would assume the authorities of the president even though the condition we are in is not normal? We are living under very difficult circumstances indeed, and these circumstances can overthrow such a government or divide it into two governments. And we would thereby fall into this divisive prohibition.

This stance by the speaker of the Chamber of Deputies countered some political speculations regarding the search for arbitration by a nationalist and waiting

for developments that may change the given factors of the present situation. On the other hand, it presented the possibility that the group which is rejecting al-Shaykh Bashir al-Jumayyil's presidential candidacy may boycott the [parliamentary] session. This appeared to arouse fears that Lebanon may be on the verge of a political or a national crisis. Those who talk about the boycott idea expect the boycott to be confined to Muslim members of parliament and a few political leaders who represent the National Movement. However, this is still a possibility that has not yet materialized because none of the Muslim leaders has defined his position, and none has publicly proposed the idea of a boycott and expressed his refusal to participate in electing the Phalangist candidate. In recent days frantic political activity has been observed aimed at finding out the sentiments of the Islamic group and how amenable that group is to a boycott as well as to what extent it will accept the boycott and the boycott method. This is based on the fact that discussions are to be conducted with Islamic leaders about the need for avoiding the boycott trap because the outcome of a boycott would be extremely grave. This Islamic boycott may bring about a Christian reaction that would insist on the election of al-Shaykh Bashir with or without the participation of an Islamic rightist minority. This would create serious domestic conditions that would provide Israel with golden opportunities for reinforcing and prolonging its occupation, and it would open the door to all possibilities, including that of partitioning and dividing Lebanon and establishing small sectarian states.

Some of those who think it unlikely that the election of a new president will turn from being a solution to a cause for a new crisis that would exacerbate existing national and sectarian division on the land do not expect a grave situation of this kind to materialize. This is because the positions of various Islamic leaders encourage optimism that the election of a president will become a unifying factor and a solution to the problem, not the opposite. In light of this conviction, contacts with some Islamic leaders began a few days ago. It was during these contacts that were carried out by responsible leaders in the Phalangist party that the subject of electing al-Shaykh Bashir al-Jumayyil was proposed.

It was not on principle that Prime Minister Sa'ib Salam objected to al-Shaykh Bashir, but he regarded al-Shaykh Bashir's candidacy and his election under these particular circumstances as something that may run into opposition and may create a crisis in the country. Prime Minister Salam suggested that it would be possible to get a national consensus about another candidate, and he nominated Brig Gen Raymond Iddih. However, Prime Minister Salam's proposal was not accepted by Phalangists, and other Christian leaders rejected it also. Contacts continued to be made, but no final agreement was reached.

The reason for this climate which is prevailing over the outset of the first presidential campaign is that most parliamentary and non-parliamentary political forces have not determined their position yet because the opportunity still exists for the password that will ultimately settle the situation.

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LEBANON

PEACE TREATY NECESSARY FOR ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic No 284, 31 Jul 82 pp 20-21

[Article: "Is a Separate Peace Treaty the Price for Withdrawal?"]

[Text] Begin's proposal for a separate peace treaty between Israel and Lebanon is worrying Lebanese political circles because it may be the price for Israel's withdrawal. Regardless of their political orientations, the Lebanese people are rejecting Israel's proposal at the present time.

What if Israel were to make a separate peace treaty that Lebanon would sign with it one of the basic conditions for its total withdrawal from Lebanese territory?

Israel began talking about a peace treaty with Lebanon as though it were a foregone conclusion. It was rationalizing this by saying that Lebanon was not better than Egypt and that to Lebanon the land in the south and in al-Jabal was not more sacred than Sinai was to Egypt.

Foreign correspondents who came to Lebanon from Israel by land by way of al-Naqrurah stated that they had confirmed information that Menahem Begin's government did have ready-made plans dealing with peace negotiations and a peace treaty with Lebanon. These plans also contain specific ideas that have to do with re-drawing the borders between Lebanon and Israel, and they include an agreement to divide the waters of the Litani and perhaps to go back to [President] Johnson's U.S. plan regarding the tributaries of the Jordan River. Those correspondents said that prominent Israeli officials were placing this matter on a scale of priorities after finishing with the Beirut problem and terminating the military and political presence of the PLO in Lebanon. Their discussions about this matter revolve around the fact that one of the first functions of government in Lebanon will be to enter into peace negotiations with Israel, to conclude a peace treaty with it and to sign agreements for normalizing relations.

This information from the press gave senior Lebanese officials and some political leaders as well pause when they came upon a statement mentioned recently in an address by Israel's prime minister, Menahem Begin. [Among other things] Begin said, "After a peace treaty is signed between Israel and Lebanon, I will suggest to King Husayn that he meet with us either in Jerusalem or in Amman to sign a peace treaty between Israel and his kingdom." Prominent Israeli ministers, like

Foreign Minister Shamir or Defense Minister Sharon, had previously issued statements which stated that Israel wanted a peace treaty with Lebanon. However, these statements were then considered mere expressions of an old Israeli policy, especially since everything that was said by U.S. envoy Philip Habib since he came to Lebanon after the Israeli invasion affirmed the statement that the idea of asking Lebanon to sign a peace treaty with Israel was not being proposed or considered by the United States.

In its context in Menahem Begin's address the statement aroused many doubts and reinforced many fears about Israel's intentions in Lebanon, particularly the fact that Begin's words seemed to regard the matter as imminent.

It was this that led Lebanon's prime minister, Shafiq al-Wazzan to respond to that statement by making a statement to the press saying that Lebanon would not sign a separate peace treaty with Israel. Ever since that reply, the possibility that Israel may impose a separate peace on Lebanon has been occupying a considerable portion of Lebanese political attention at this period of time, especially since Israel's emphasis on signing a peace treaty with Lebanon has begun arousing worries about creating obstacles and more complications in the search for a political solution to the situation in West Beirut and to the problem of the Palestinian presence in Lebanon.

Political and official agencies asked U.S. Presidential Envoy Philip Habib to interfere and to prevent Israel from going too far in proposing a peace treaty with Lebanon. Accordingly, it was necessary that a U.S. official position be proclaimed directly from Washington. It was stated that the U.S. administration did not intend to call upon Lebanon to sign a peace treaty with Israel and that Washington refused to link the Israeli withdrawal with the signing of a peace treaty.

When Philip Habib told some politicians that this was the opinion of his government and his president, it was said that the fact that Israel was raising this matter in particular at the present time implied one of two things: Israel was either determined to impose a peace treaty on Lebanon and to link its final withdrawal from Lebanon with the signing of this treaty, or perhaps it was deliberately raising this matter to hold up and impede the efforts that were being made to achieve a solution to the Lebanese problem. This is because raising this matter increases the intransigence of numerous Arab and Palestinian parties and gives them the right to say that Israel did not come into Lebanon to solve its problem, but rather to single it out and to impose a separate peace treaty on it. At the present time a peace treaty would be unacceptable to Arabs before a formula for a solution to the Palestinian question is agreed upon.

This continuing political debate introduced this question into the presidential campaign as one of its basic issues. Defining a clear position on signing a peace treaty with Lebanon became one of the positions that any presidential candidate had to proclaim clearly as a program for his government's policy. It was this that led the Phalangist party, which is campaigning for al-Shaykh Bashir al-Jumayyil, to define its position promptly and to convey that position not only to the various Lebanese groups, but also to major Arab countries that exercise influence and play a role in the course of Lebanon's domestic politics. Attorney Karim Baqraduni, member of the Political Bureau of the Phalangist party admitted

this when he told AL-MUSTAQBAL, "As a party, we defined our position on the question of peace with Israel as follows:

--"First, no president can unilaterally make such a grave decision. This is because deciding to sign a peace treaty with Israel requires a national decision. To put it more clearly, one must consult various parties and Lebanese groups before making a national decision of this kind.

--"Second, past experiences that we have had throughout the Arab-Israeli struggle and after the new developments on the scene since the 1967 war make it necessary now that we not go back to the old Arab logic of cooperating with Israel in war or peace. This is because it was meaningless slogans and acts of oneupmanship that brought the Palestinian question and the Arab world in its entirety to where it stands with Israel. It was also the policy of rejection for the sake of rejection that led us into a stage in which Israel is even refusing to return the West Bank and Gaza to Palestinians where they can establish their state, after being exposed in 1948 to the partitioning of Palestine and its division between Israel and the Palestinians. Thus, Arabs have to give thorough consideration to the method of dealing with Israel. Accordingly, the old mentality which depended on slogans and acts of oneupmanship must be dropped. This old mentality had no other objective but that of ensuring the interests of regimes."

After that al-Shaykh Bashir al-Jumayyil made an official announcement in a political program presented by Phalangist Radio and declared himself a candidate for the presidency. When he was asked what his position will be, if he were elected president, on Israel's statement that it would sign a peace treaty with Lebanon, he gave almost the same answer. He said that it was premature to consider this grave matter, and he linked it ultimately with new domestic, Arab and international developments. He said that a national position on the question and deliberations with Arab countries in the light of new given factors were required.

The phenomenon that attracted the attention of observers was that Israel's proposal of a peace treaty with Lebanon did not create, despite the existing conditions, any new Lebanese divisions on this matter. Quite the contrary, various Lebanese political groups refused to support a matter such as this unilaterally. Even when President Camille Sham'un was asked what he thought Israel's price would be in case it withdraws, he replied, "We would have nothing to give Israel for its position but gratitude." However, those observers are asking, "Will the Lebanese situation remain unchanged in the future when the time for Israel's withdrawal comes and Israel proposes a peace treaty as the price for its withdrawal? This would be in the event that existing complications are solved and the justifications which Israel uses to cover up its continued occupation cease to exist.

Some European countries in particular have views and information regarding this matter in particular, and they conveyed them to Lebanese officials. These European capitals believe that among the matters that are agreed upon and that they and the Americans accept is that ultimately Lebanon will not become an obstacle to a settlement of the crisis in the area and of the Palestinian problem. Accordingly, Lebanon whose predicament destroyed its institutions and created political and sectarian divisions among its people, will not be able to face Israeli pressures that would impose on it a separate peace treaty,

regardless of the identity of the new government in Lebanon and regardless of the power this new government or the new president may have.

However, this European information states that it seems difficult that the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon, if completed, will be carried out without a price tag. Given the difficulty of Lebanon unilaterally signing a separate peace with Israel, Lebanon will nevertheless be asked to negotiate with Israel. At the present time a non-aggression pact with Israel and not a separate peace treaty with it would be satisfactory.

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LEBANON

ISRAEL SAID TO BE TAKING OVER ECONOMY OF SOUTH

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic No 284, 31 Jul 82 pp 36, 37

[Article: "Normalization of the Economy under the Israeli Invasion"]

[Text] Israel began carrying out in Lebanon a well-considered plan for normalizing all levels of the economy.

In doing so Israel is taking advantage of the circumstances of the invasion and of the blockade.

If the Lebanese people do not realize that they have to fight this, then what is left of Lebanon's economy will be totally destroyed.

While the principals of government are preoccupied in political negotiations that take place sometimes to save Beirut and other times to find a final or a partial solution to the Palestinian problem, and while the blockade on West Beirut continues--at least as far as fuel is concerned--something very serious is taking place alongside these negotiations and under their cover. Israel is continuing its economic penetration of Lebanon to deprive that country of its distinguishing roles in the region in more than one area.

So far, no one has scientifically and incisively come to terms with the dimensions and objectives of this penetration. People who ought to be concerned are hardly paying any attention to the manifestations and forms of this penetration. It is unfortunate that Israel's economic penetration of Lebanon appears to be calculated every step of the way. Plans for that economic penetration were drawn along with the military and political plans. No sooner did the Israeli army complete its subjugation of the areas it had occupied in the south and in al-Biqa' to al-Shuf and 'Alayh and all the way to a part of Beirut, than all the institutions of the Israeli economy were rushed in. This was part of a plan that every day appears to have been one that was carefully considered and tightly planned.

An observer of this penetration will notice one of two things: Israel will either stay in Lebanon, and this is part of her expansionist plan which it declared more than once; or it will withdraw from Lebanon after destroying Lebanon's economy and leaving it in shambles. It would then become easy for Israel to devour this economy and divest it of all its ideals in the ensuing political phase for which preparations are now being made. Actually, new indicators and further normalization of the Lebanese economy is taking place every day of Israel's occupation of

Lebanon. Recently, this normalization has taken new directions in addition to the earlier ones. These may be set forth as follows:

The Invasion of Commodities

Ever since the earliest days of the invasion, Israeli vegetables and fruits have been pouring into the south and from there to other areas. It's been noticed that since the beginning vegetables and fruits were part of the blockade that was imposed on West Beirut. This is because that serves Israel's economic interests. Naturally, vegetables and fruits are brought into the capital in an illegitimate fashion, and large sums of money are paid for them. What is noteworthy about Israeli vegetables and fruits is their cut-rate prices which undercut Lebanese products that have suffered for years from the burdens of high costs as a result of inflation.

Israeli competition reached the point that apples were made available before their season in Lebanon's markets so as to anticipate the season for Lebanon's apples which is a basic season for Lebanese farmers. It is known that Arab markets may be inaccessible to Lebanese farmers this season. There is no doubt that the agricultural invasion of Lebanon has left and is leaving negative marks on people working in that sector, especially farmers who have found no alternative way to earn a living but that of looking towards the occupying country, especially if employment opportunities remain limited or non-existent in Beirut or elsewhere. This economic invasion is no longer confined to vegetables and fruits only, but it has gone beyond that to other manufactured products such as different electrical appliances, construction materials and other goods. Tomorrow, there will be new products, if import activity from the ports of Beirut and Tripoli remains limited and dangerous.

Confiscating Organizations

Israeli authorities are also confiscating an organization of industrial and commercial firms under the pretext that its owners are Syrians or Palestinians. This became particularly evident in factories in al-Na'imah, and in north al-Damur where large quantities of lumber and iron were confiscated. In addition, other institutions were confiscated in al-Ghaziyah near Sidon and in the industrial city south of the capital of the south.

There is no doubt that this unjustified action constitutes a violation of private property which Israel claims to the West it tries hard to preserve. Israel's action constitutes a process in which these goods are really destroyed, and that affects the Lebanese economy.

Economic circles actually took action on this dangerous phenomenon, and they were able to regain part of this confiscated property. However, the effect of this action by the economic circles will remain limited if unaccompanied by intense action, especially in other circles.

Tourism and Transportation

Israel mobilized its tourist organizations and transportation companies after its military invasion of Lebanon. Israeli buses make regular trips to Lebanon; groups

of Israeli tourists come to south Lebanon; and Lebanese citizens go to Israel. In addition, Israel adopted plans for regulating air traffic: (see the previous issue of AL-MUSTAQBAL). Furthermore, postal services are routed through Israel.

Banks

From the hitherto unsuccessful attempt to usurp Lebanese banks of their confidentiality, Israel has been trying to force Lebanese citizens to use Israeli currency to do business. It has been trying to do that through its mobile banks and by forcing Lebanese importers to pay half the cost of the goods they import in Israeli currency.

Doing business in Israeli currency assumes several forms, and the least that may be said about the complications of such action is that it poses a major threat to the Lebanese economy, and it applies pressure on the Lebanese pound. Furthermore, it improves Israel's balance of payments. Although the government has warned banks against using the Israeli pound to do business, the day may come when Lebanese banks will be forced to use Israeli currency because of existing trade traffic.

Delaying Production

These normalization procedures are taking place at a time during which the Lebanese economy is going through a phase of total paralysis as a result of the Israeli war which severed all links, stopped all machinery, divested all industrial zones of their workers, closed the ports and shut down facilities.

If this situation remains unchanged for a third month, the holding up of salaries will become universal and the fact that factories are closing down will begin to show. With Lebanese industry at a standstill, Israel's invasion will have control of the situation, and it may then be said that the trade in food is the only one left. However, how long will it last?

The Premeditated Blockade

The fact that Israel has resorted a blockade of food supplies and has let that blockade assume various forms every day was intended to stimulate a black market for most goods. It is known that a black market would significantly weaken the Lebanese economy and would increase the pressures on Lebanese currency.

Despite the fuel blockade that is imposed on West Beirut, Israeli gasoline can be found in Beirut where it is sold at high prices. In addition, educational institutions have suffered non-economic damages. Some schools laid off teachers because school buildings had been destroyed, salaries could not be paid or because a clear view of the next academic year was not available.

Israel is even conspiring against the health of the Lebanese people. Electricity is not available in [some] areas, and water also is not available in most areas of al-Jabal. Garbage is piling up in West Beirut, and that is creating a growing problem because of the communicable and non-communicable diseases that this garbage may cause. This health problem will not be confined to West Beirut; it will affect most of the population.

The fact that the Israeli invasion has continued in this manner ensures the accompanying economic invasion that is threatening Lebanon's present and future. This is happening while the principal figures in government are preoccupied in political negotiations that may not end any time soon.

Although western statements agree about adhering to a unified, independent Lebanon, [the question is] which Lebanon will be the one to become united and independent? What economy will be left for Lebanon with which and through which it can rebuild itself and play the role that it used to play until 1974? There is no doubt that disregarding this invasion is a matter that represents a genuine threat. In this regard one may resort to several measures. The most important of these are:

--First, the government is to form a committee of specialized experts. Its function would be to monitor this invasion, be mindful of it and take the measures that are necessary to oppose it.

--Second, this committee is to inform citizens on all levels and to call their attention to the dangers of complying with this invasion.

--Third, economic organizations are to take part in this mission. It is known that despite their various sectors and sectarian affiliations these organizations have a sense of the impending danger, and all, or at least most of them, agree that operations to normalize the economy must be opposed. This economic action may have a patriotic feature that would constitute one of the cornerstones of accord.

Economic organizations have become aware of this fact, and they have begun taking action. Will the government and the various groups of politicians become conscious of these profound threats whose effects, if established, will not be wiped out until a long time has elapsed?

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BANKING SECTOR REPORTED STRONG DESPITE INVASION

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic No 283, 24 Jul 82 p 40

[Article: "The War and Lebanon's Banks; Confidence Defeats Guns"]

[Text] More than one banker admits that the nature or vehemence of current events which Lebanon is experiencing differs from the previous events of 1975 and 1976 and, accordingly, those of 1978 and 1981 as well. Those bankers also admit that banks had taken precautions and had made plans for all possible contingencies, except for that of an Israeli invasion such as the one that occurred.

Nevertheless, the banking sector remains until today the only sector operating with noticeable efficiency since the Israeli invasion of 6 June. At the same time most other sectors have been totally or partially immobilized.

Now that 1 month and a half have gone by since Israel's invasion of Lebanon and its occupation of more than one third of its territory, one can state that banking operations have the following principal features:

--First, basic banking services continue to be available and continue to be satisfactory, even though services offered by banks now are less efficient than those that were offered during the previous events in which the Israeli army was not a party. Israel's blockade of West Beirut and the constant threat that West Beirut would be invaded has left basic marks on the banking industry as a result of the fact that operations were suspended in bank branches in the western section of West Beirut and the bank branches themselves were closed. This is in the area from al-Rawshah and Corniche al-Mazra'ah to the southern neighborhood. Employee turnover in banks of the western district also rose as a result of the fact that those who were able to leave West Beirut and go to safer areas did.

In addition to the safety factor, the fact that public services--electricity, water and telecommunications services--have not been regularly available has caused some banking services to falter. As a result of the fact that the standard of banking services fell relatively, some savers complained, and the banks took some practical measures to deal with these complaints. In addition, banks asked their customers to be understanding about the situation and about the reality of existing material difficulties which cannot be overcome. They asked them to compare the standard of services with that which may be found in other sectors, especially hotels and restaurants.

The most notable problem that banks faced may have been that of convening bank clearing meetings in the principal offices of the Bank of Lebanon whereby checks drawn on other banks would be honored, entered into the accounts of customers or, in some cases, paid in cash. Banks also are no longer able to cash checks drawn on a branch other than that where a check is presented.

Some banks tried to face this problem by taking several emergency measures among which were [the following]:

--First, a number of banks declared their willingness to receive the customers of any other branch at one or more branches that were more capable of doing business. This flexibility may be the result of the fact that the local banking system had been expanding before the events and and it was expanding during the events.

Second, with instructions from the banking society banks have been making a tireless effort to hold unofficial bank clearing meetings or to conduct bilateral exchanges among banks. The first signs of that became evident last week.

--Third, telephones and telexes would be used whenever possible to attempt to deal with the process of cashing checks issued on another branch.

Other than that, banking services continued to be normal, uncontrolled by any emergency measures. There were no limits on withdrawals, no restrictions on converting currency and no aversion to currency operations--these have become limited--and to letters of credit--these were few because of the difficulties involved in importing and exporting. Banks also did not hesitate to use express postal services that are offered by private companies, despite the exorbitant costs of these services.

--Fourth, withdrawals became the most important aspect of the banking sector's operations ever since the Israeli invasion which has become the principal preoccupation of international and regional politics. Withdrawals continued to be quite normal, and this is based on daily observations. The fact that withdrawals continued to be limited in the atmosphere of panic and alarm which prevailed over Lebanon in general and Beirut in particular provides new testimony that there was confidence in Lebanon's banking system. It provides evidence of the fact that the efficiency of banks is well established in the minds of banks' customers: businessmen and people who have savings accounts and regular checking accounts in those banks.

Among manifestations of the fact that there was no rush on any of the banks are [the following]:

1. The Bank of Lebanon has not yet received any application from any bank regarding terms that would provide that bank with additional cash to meet withdrawals. This is despite the fact that the Bank of Lebanon is careful about covering all bank applications it may receive. This proves that banks have cash and are comfortable with the current flow of withdrawals.

2. In an almost normal fashion banks are continuing to purchase short-term treasury bills as they would do under normal circumstances. During the period from 7

June, the onset of the Israeli invasion, until 5 July there were five issues. Previous bank issues of about 1.5 billion pounds reached maturity, and new bills were purchased for about 1.3 billion pounds. That is, holdings in all the banks were about 250 million pounds only. Monetary circles state that the fact that banks took it upon themselves to have this additional amount of cash on hand was a precautionary measure for what may happen and not for what is happening.

3. Interest rates on Lebanese pounds remained almost the same in Lebanese banks when demand was low for 1 or for several months. At all times it was between 13 and 15 percent. The fact that interest rates are stable also reflects the sound cash condition that exists in most banks. Banks do not have to borrow from other banks, [a measure] which causes interest rates to rise. The fact that interest rates are stable among banks affirms not only that withdrawals are ordinary, but it also denies the existence of "special cases in some small banks."

This is as far as appearances are concerned. The most important reasons for the phenomenon of ordinary withdrawals are as follows:

--Confidence in the banking industry and in its ability to ensure services, even at decisive and critical moments.

--The confidence that most citizens feel that what is happening, despite its enormity, may provide the light at the end of that dark tunnel which Lebanon entered 8 years ago. In fact, the existing feeling which may be based on some political positions, may not be disregarded. This is a feeling which is convinced that Lebanon will once again become a stable homeland with a strong, central government. This feeling is the principal reason behind the fact that not only has there been not a rush on withdrawals, but that large amounts of cash were also not converted into other currencies.

--Withdrawing funds from banks and keeping them in homes expose these funds to dangers and perils that are much greater than those they would be exposed to if they were kept in banks. Therefore, most savers have tried to keep on hand only the cash they need; they would increase that occasionally to meet probable situations or the rise in prices that would occur under these conditions.

--Just as withdrawals remained ordinary and were conducted without any panic or rush, operations to convert the Lebanese pound to other currencies and especially to dollars remained normal also. And just as speculations about the possibility that the Lebanese predicament will come to an end were behind ordinary withdrawals, these speculations were also the principal reason why the Lebanese pound was preserved.

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IDF BATTLES ALONG CENTRAL ROUTE DESCRIBED

Tel Aviv BAMAHAHE in Hebrew 20 Jun 82 pp 14-15

[Article by Eli Mohar: "The Mission: Opening the Central Route"]

[Text] When you consider in the overview the battle in the Biqa', you learn that the IDF operated there initially along three routes, or more precisely, in three efforts, and farther on, when the Biqa' (the Arabic name of the Lebanon valley which means simply "the valley," and this is also what it is called by the IDF soldiers there) widens--in four efforts. You also learn that there were several stages to the IDF advance in the Biqa'.

The maps show clearly the various stages and the arrows which go north-eastward, curve here and there, and advance until they stop at a point beyond which are marked the enemy deployments. This is the dry, general picture which says very little about how things happened, the struggles, and the difficulties of the many and varied forces which were operating and were part of what we call here an "effort" and how they overcame them. One week ago we related here a small segment of this enormous mosaic, the breakthrough battle which was a part of the effort on the central route, from the viewpoint of the infantry troops who went into combat on their APC's. At the end of my conversation with the soldiers, they told me that I must speak to the tankers who were with them. "Listen," they said, "they did the main job. They were excellent." The soldiers' commander, Effi, told me to find Doron. "I don't know what they call their battalion," he said, "in communications their code name was..." and he mentioned the code name.

Armed with this information, I went out to look for them in the changing reality of the Biqa' in which units were moving and skipping around, changing locations, and it was difficult to reach them. A week later I almost located this tank unit, a reserve unit composed of men who were all from the hesder yeshivas [advanced religious schools in which the students devote part of their time to study and part of their time to military training], 23 to 26 years of age. The cadre were outstanding armor personnel. This unit was at one time a unit of Shermans, but now it is composed of Pattons. Its headquarters companies and armored infantry have remained from the Sherman period, and these are the veteran, mature, and very solid companies who experienced together the Yom Kippur War and were together even

before it. For the tankers themselves this was their first battle. They entered it without knowing precisely "how it is," without knowing what to expect.

Doron, the unit commander, was 30, from Herzliyya, and an employee of the Ministry of Defense. For him the unit's war began on Sunday, the first day of Operation Peace for the Galilee with a telephone call to his place of work which ordered him to the base. He alerted the other commanders and by noon all of them had already reached the base. Afterwards the unit was prepared for movement and went north at night in two convoys. At midnight Doron was called to a command conference at the division, in which his unit was attached to an infantry unit whose mission was the opening of the central route in the Bika'. On Tuesday before noon the unit moved from the assembly areas and joined the infantry unit. A part of the force was sent ahead to join the infantry unit, and this is how they spent the night with the infantry to the right of the route, one force to the left, and the rest of the unit in the rear along the route. Throughout the night they were shelled by the Syrian artillery.

Early Wednesday morning, the order came to move out with the tank unit, again operating independently, advancing in front of the infantry, and spread out to the right and left of the route. The unit advanced to the area of the pit traps, the first pit, and then after circling around it, the commander of one of the forces identified mines. He began to explode mines, but one of the tanks went over a mine. The engineers went in by foot and began to explode mines, and all this under heavy artillery fire "which they ignored," says Doron, "and with which they had to live." "It is desirable to live with it," smiles Ayal, the commander of one of the forces nearby.

A Permanent Companion

While clearing the mines, one of the forces reported that the bridge, the first pit trap, was blown up, and the unit could advance by circumventing it. The executive officer of the engineer unit, Beni, prepared an additional way ("yes, under artillery fire. We were no longer noting this, but it must be understood that all the time there was artillery fire, a permanent companion"). The tanks advanced and went up on a ridge behind the route. Beyond the ridge, to the left of the route there was a group of houses among which there were trenches and terrorist equipment--everything abandoned. One force went in with fire and dug in; another force passed it and moved to the next ridge. An additional force joined it and began to identify targets in the area of the village of Adh Dhunaybah.

In an exchange of fire the tank of Matti, one of the force commanders, received a direct hit. The entire firing deployment went out of operation, and Matti was hit in the hand by a fragment. The tank moved backward, Matti descended, was bandaged, and went up on another tank. The tanks moved back with him, but after several meters, they moved forward again and destroyed

three tanks and two anti-tank guns. The exchange of fire continued until the evening hours.

The advance continued. The next pit trap was not detonated, and the tanks and the infantry crossed over it. The area of the winding paths was behind them, and at night the tank unit received another mission: to move out and occupy the next village, Hush Adh Dhunaybah, located on the plateau which widens after the area of the winding paths. So began the difficult and nerve-wracking night for the tankers between Wednesday and Thursday.

Suddenly, Quiet Prevailed

The tanks moved up onto the plateau, and absolute quiet suddenly prevailed. Absolute quiet. The village with which there was previously an exchange of fire was silent, and the tanks passed through it on their way to the next village.

The tanks moved along the route at intervals with the intention of stopping, turning right, and in spread formation, entering immediately the village to the right of the route.

They move along the route. Complete silence. Darkness. A night with a full moon. And quiet.

About 20 meters before the point at which the battalion intended to turn, there was an explosion.

A tank went up in flames. Instantly.

At that moment it seemed that the Syrians had deployed RPG teams in the village, and the tanks went down automatically to the left of the route and opened fire on the village.

The tank which was hit was burning.

The driver and the gunner were killed instantly. Pinhas Bak, the loader-radioman, managed to get out.

Chini, the commander of the tank just ahead, saw him. He jumped outside and began to extinguish the fire with his hands in fireproof gloves. The overalls disintegrated instantly since it was not fireproof, and this was one of the lessons of the Yom Kippur War. Then the burning overalls stuck to the body and caused severe burns. Chini lowered a stretcher, moved Pinhas to an APC, and it evacuated him to a mobile army surgical hospital.

No One Saw Tzahi

No one saw the tank commander, Tzahi Elazari. Everyone assumed that he had been killed. However, Tzahi also rolled out of the tank on the other side

that faces the village. In this way, hidden by the tank from his comrades, he lay wounded an entire night. It was only in the morning that they found Tzahi. He arrived at the mobile army surgical hospital alive, and Henry the infantry medical officer will not forget him. He talked, laughed, and encouraged the other wounded and the doctors who were treating him. He was seriously wounded, says Henry about Tzahi Elazari of blessed memory. He died of his wounds in the hospital.

While Chini was evacuating Pinhas, Doron ordered the tanks to leave the area of the village and redeploy. Two of the tanks had a communications problem, and they did not hear the order. They moved forward and passed by the village. Somehow they received the order to stop since one of them that could not transmit was able to receive. One of them went over a stone fence alongside the road and got stuck. The second tank returned to the unit, and an APC was sent to extricate the crew of the tank which was stuck with the intention of returning and extricating it at daylight.

The unit regrouped and received an order to take up positions in the direction of the village. The tanks cut off their motors. In the quiet which prevailed it was possible to distinctly hear the sounds of the tanks up ahead.

Great Tension

"All night we heard tank motors," says Doron, "there was great tension. Everyone was in the turrets, everyone was constantly checking the internal communications system to see if they were all awake because it is known that in the armor the driver has a tendency to doze. The entire time there was a feeling that the Syrians would appear at any moment. The noise of the motors was heard incessantly the entire night. We did not close our eyes. No one in the unit will forget that night."

It was only in the morning that the puzzle was solved. The noise of the motors that was heard the entire night was the noise of the motors of the tank of the force which was stuck up ahead near the village on the stone fence. The crew forgot to turn off the motor when it left. This noise apparently also frightened the Syrians who were up ahead and farther down the road. They also thought that Israeli tanks were going to move against them at any moment but their nerves did not hold up. The following morning down the road we found a T-62 tank and nearby a modern APC, both of them abandoned. It seems, therefore, that it was not an RPG team but a tank which hit our tank, and therefore it caught fire. The Syrians fled, but Doron hastens to point out that this was an exception. Along the entire route the Syrians fought stubbornly, he says, and his officers confirm this. They did not flee.

Everyone Hit It

On Thursday at dawn the infantry entered the village and occupied it. The tank unit advanced, found the abandoned Syrian tank, and passed it, and then

one of the force's tanks was hit by a Syrian tank. This is actually how the fighting went the entire time: we would move forward, and when we suddenly encountered an obstacle, we knew that enemy tanks were up ahead.

Two of the unit's forces spread out, engaged in a firefight, and destroyed four Syrian tanks. Then one force continued to advance while the second force covered from the right side of the road. While moving they detected a T-62 that was trying to escape, and then while stopping, four tanks fired at it and they all hit it. Within 5 seconds from the time that it was detected, the tank received four direct hits.

One force moved ahead to take up forward positions, and its tank was hit in the turret. Internal communication in the tank was cut off. The commander, the loader-radioman, and the gunner were not hurt, but they did not know what happened to the driver. The driver, Dani Weinberg, was wounded in the hand. He did not know what happened to the others, and on his own initiative, he rolled the tank backwards and in this way saved it from another hit. The crew got out, and the loader-radioman, a sixth year medical student, bandaged the driver. The tank of the executive officer of one of the forces picked up the four and while evacuating them fired and destroyed another Syrian tank.

Sad but Not Crushed

The tank commander, Dani Hartman, arrived in the rear and found another tank. He boarded it and asked its commander to give him command of the tank since he wanted to return to the battle as a tank commander. The tank commander, as a gesture, agreed and became the loader-radioman. In this way Dani Hartman returned to the battle while in the meantime the tanks of two of the forces encountered heavy fire. One of the forces turned right in a flanking movement, went up on the ridge, and from a range of 2500 meters destroyed 2 tanks. The third Syrian tank continued to fight until it also was hit. "It did not flee," emphasizes Doron, "in spite of the fact that two were already burning nearby."

This is how the unit fought until noon Thursday. Every time it tried to advance it encountered heavy tank fire. During that stage, there was also heavy artillery fire. Heavy, emphasizes Ehud, but at 5 pm the unit tried once again to break through, and this time it succeeded and without casualties. One force even managed to destroy two Syrian tanks before the unit was deployed to take up positions at nightfall in the direction of Rashayya.

This actually marked the end of the unit's fighting--3 continuous days of stubborn battles over a segment of a winding, rocky, difficult to traverse path which would later be described on the maps in the tents of the General Staff Branch and the commander as a part of the effort on the central route.

The unit learned in this battle the meaning of war. It learned to have high regard for the Syrian soldier and it also discovered its ability, its professional capability, its stubbornness. Doron describes unhesitatingly the situation in the unit after the fighting: "one force--sad, but not crushed," he emphasizes, "sad because it remembers its casualties. The second force has excellent morale. And the entire unit has a high morale because we fought for a long time and we advanced, and we carried out what had to be done."

5830

CSO: 4423/190

BRIEFS

PORT CAPACITY--The accommodating capacity of the Jamahiriyah's ocean ports was increased to 8 million tons of goods during the first quarter of the year. In addition, three 459,000-ton oil tankers and three 27,000-ton freighters were acquired during this period. Storage areas were completed in the al-Gharyan area of Tripoli. Contracts were signed for the implementation of various projects including works that are part of the second phase of development of the port of Darnah and the seaport of Tripoli. Another of these projects was the paving of storage areas in the port of Benghazi. The ports were also supplied with machinery and equipment to raise the efficiency of the Jamahiriyah's seaports. The 1981-85 transition plan for the ports and marine transport sector aims at raising the accommodating capacity of the ports and increasing the Libyan Arab Merchant Marine Fleet's share of the volume of general goods by 40 percent. This will be accomplished by increasing the number of ships from 8 to 36. [Text] [Tripoli AL-FAIR AL-JADID in Arabic 10 Jun 82 p 2] 8591

AIRFIELD DEVELOPMENT--Sources from the General Popular Committee for Communications and Marine Transport stated that the goals of the transition plan in the area of airports and air transport include the completion of projects currently undergoing implementation and development and the construction of new airports and airfields. The 1981-85 transition plan calls for the construction of three large domestic airports, nine medium-sized domestic airfields, and 11 desert airfields in addition to the preparation of studies and plans pertaining to models of medium-sized airports. The sources also reported the completion of the first phase of the Ghaddams, al-Kafrah, Sirt, and al-Sarir airport projects as well as the first phase of the development of Sabha International Airport. A contract was signed for the construction of a power station for Tripoli International Airport and the Ghat airport. In the area of air transport, the 1981-85 plan aims at increasing the passenger transport fleet by 20 aircraft. To date, purchase contracts have been signed for eight Fokker aircraft and 10 Airbus planes. In addition, the passenger and aviation services complex at Tripoli International Airport has now been completed. [Text] [Tripoli AL-FAJR AL-JADID in Arabic 13 Jan 82 p 2] 8591

TELEPHONES--Sources in the secretariat of the General People's Committee for Communications and Marine Transport reported that the 1981-82 transition plan aims at improving telephone services and raising the number of telephones from 6 to 10 telephones per 100 persons by the end of the plan in 1985. This will be accomplished through the construction of new network exchanges and the

expansion of existing ones. The sources added that some 40,000 telephone lines have been put into service. The sources said that automatic dialing equipment has been installed in some cities and the Tripoli teletype service has been expanded. In addition, many communications channels have been opened. Contracts have been signed for the installation of two new exchanges with a capacity of 49,500 lines and the expansion of 68 telephone exchanges with a 13,000 line capacity. A contract has also been signed for the implementation of a project to link the People's Communication Office with the other people's offices. Other contracts provide for expansion of automatic dialing stations and the satellite receiving station as well as the construction of new local stations. The sources from the secretariat of the People's Committee for Communications and Marine Transport added that contracts have been signed for the implementation of more than 30 post office buildings and telephone exchanges and the implementation of five new telephone systems in the municipalities. [Text] [Tripoli AL-FAJR AL-JADID in Arabic 17 Jun 82 p 2] 8591

PLASTICS EXPORT--A new shipment of BPC plastic produced by the Abu Kammash chemicals complex was exported yesterday morning. This shipment, which was sent to Sweden, consisted of 1,000 tons of the BPC plastic. The chemicals complex previously exported 200 tons of plastics to England as a preliminary test which proved successful. The sources at the Abu Kammash chemicals complex reported that 1,400 tons of plastics and 7,000 tons of caustic soda will be exported next week. [Text] [Tripoli AL-FAJR AL-JADID in Arabic 20 Jun 82 p 8] 8591

CSO: 4504/379

GOVERNMENT PLANS TO HELP INDUSTRIES

Muscat OMAN DAILY OBSERVER in English 3 Aug 82 p 7

[Text]

THE Ministry of Commerce and Industry plans to spend about OR21.9 million during the current year on assisting an estimated 60 to 70 industrial projects.

Some of these projects will have an equity of as much as OR 6 million.

So far, the Ministry has approved a total of OR2.17 million in loans and grants.

These will be spent on expansion or to repay outstanding debts owed to Oman Development Bank and commercial banks, according to Central Bank of Oman publication "Al Markazi."

The projects are two ice plants in Al Kamil and Al Manuma, an asbestos factory, an insulation foam factory, a fertilizer factory and a printing press — all in the Capital Area — as well as a carpentry project at Sur.

The Ministry grants loans only to small enterprises with a maximum capital of OR100,000. The maximum

amount of each grant is 25 per cent of its capital.

To be eligible for the loan the project has to be already existing and producing and located outside the Capital Area. The enterprise has to be a joint stock company with a minimum of 75 per cent Omani ownership.

In addition to inviting the private sector to submit feasibility studies to obtain financial assistance for industrial projects, the Ministry has also commissioned the preparation of ten such studies and is currently offering these ideas to the private sector.

The Government assistance is expected to encourage Omanis to participate in industrial projects and to diversify from the more traditional commerce and trade activities with their attractive immediate high rates of return.

Although profits from industry may be realised later, the Government scheme provides a five-year grace period before repayments of these interest-free loans begin, extending over a period of 20 years.

The programme is also expected to magnify the return of investment in industry in the absence of interest charges.

BRIEFS

MEDIA COOPERATION WITH PAKISTAN--PAKISTAN and Oman are considering a deal that will see both countries' journalists flying between Muscat and Islamabad. Under the new agreement, journalists from Pakistan would work in the Sultanate, transferring their experience of 35 years broadcasting to this country, while would-be Omani media-men could train in Pakistan. Pakistan, has proposed a mutual-exchange scheme through its Information Secretary, Major General Mjui-bur Rahman. According to diplomatic sources, Major General Rahman first put the plan to Oman Ministry of Information officials during a visit last year. The plan, says the Pakistani mission in Muscat, is currently being considered by top media planners at Ministry HQ. Among the proposals put forward by the team from Islamabad are: --Training for Omani journalists in the Pakistani capital; --Long-service stays for Pakistani reporters, producers and directors in Muscat, helping produce Oman newspaper, radio and TV news; --Learning the importance of regional news. At present, Pakistani broadcasting journalists have four major regional areas to cover--Peshawar, Quetta, Karachi and Lahore. The Pakistan television corporation, says local Charge d'Affaires Ghayoor Ahmed, is an independent company, owned partly by Government and partly by private interests. [Text] [Muscat OMAN OBSERVER in English 27 Jul 82 p 2]

CSO: 4400/420

BRIEFS

CEMENT PLANT CONTRACT--A South Korean consortium led by Hyundai Heavy Industries Company has bid the lowest at QR441m for a contract to extend the Qatar National Cement Company's Umm Bab Plant. The other bidders are France's Fives-Cail Babcock (QR509m), West Germany's Orenstein and Koppel (QR509m), Japan's Kobe Steel (QR515m), West Germany's KHD Humboldt Wedag (QR564m), West Germany's Krupp Polysius with Korean Heavy Industries and Construction Company (QR588m), and a consortium led by US' Fuller Company with Switzerland's BBC Brown and Belgium's Baron Leveque (QR654m). The low-bidding consortium led by the Hyundai includes US' Allis-Charmers, Korea's Hyundai Engineering and Construction Company and Japan's Onoda Cement Company. The bids are being evaluated. Construction is to begin early next year. The extension involves the setting up of a new production unit with a capacity of 2,000 tonnes of cement a day. It will be located about 10km away from the existing kilns which have a combined capacity of about 900 tonnes a day. [Text] [Doha GULF DAILY TIMES in English 28 Jul 82 p 12]

CSO: 4400/424

SIDF FIGURES ON LOANS REPORTED

Jiddah ARAB NEWS in English 29 Jul 82 p 2

[Text]

RIYADH, July 28 (SPA)—A total of SR3 billion has been disbursed in loans to Saudi-foreign joint industrial ventures by the Saudi Industrial Development Fund (SIDF) up to the end of the 1980-81 fiscal year.

According to the SIDF annual report Wednesday, the number of the joint ventures reached 190 with foreign ownership of paid up capital averaging 21 percent. SIDF is the main channel of public finance for private manufacturing, cold storage and electricity projects. Established in 1974, the fund provides interest-free loans for the construction, expansion and modernization of private industries.

Reviewing SIDF achievements during the past six years, the annual report pointed out that the fund played a prominent role in providing administrative, technical and marketing support needed for the success of the projects it finances. To guarantee implementation and operation of the projects, SIDF pursues a follow-up system through which it reviews financial statements regularly, in addition to technical check-up of buildings and equipment.

This follow-up system also provides for scrutinizing operational efficiency and evaluation of administrative potentials. SIDF is in constant contact and coordination with authorities in charge of industrial development in the country, the report stressed.

Dealing with cold storage projects, the report revealed that SIDF approved SR156 million in loans for establishing 35 projects during the year 1980-81. The fund was entrusted to manage a program for financing cold storage projects in 1979 by the Finance and National Economy Ministry. At that time, the program was allocated SR200 million.

SIDF has committed itself to finance 46

cold stores in various parts of the Kingdom.

Of the SR156 million loans approved, SR54 million was actually disbursed by the end of the 1980-81 fiscal year which saw eight of the projects go on stream.

Meanwhile, 10 loans were approved during the same year for industries involved in building materials. The 10 projects featured the use of advanced technology and large capital. Their production ranges from red bricks, pipes, ceramic tiles and fiberglass. By the end of the fiscal year, sales revenues within the industry increased by an annual margin of 65 percent.

The report said there are 10 red brick manufacturing factories in the Kingdom at present. Their overall annual production reached 900,000 tons. Five similar industries are under construction, while another two are in the planning stage, the report added.

SIDF is more closely linked to the pipe industry. By the end of 1980-81, there were 17 pipe factories in the country. The fund also has a prominent role in developing the cement industry in Saudi Arabia. Loans granted by SIDF to the six cement factories amount to SR2 billion. The fund's active participation boosted the total cement production to four million tons by the end of the fiscal year 1980-81. Saudi Arabian cement production is expected to reach 10 million tons per annum shortly, the annual report said, when the plants operate at full capacity.

In the commodities sector, where demand for loans is on the rise, SIDF provided SR268 million in loans during the 1980-81 year. That brought total SIDF loans to consumer industries to SR2.457 billion. The annual report said 28 new projects went on stream during the year as a result of SIDF's financing, especially in mineral water, dairy products, meat packaging, pasta, light meals, paper products, furniture and plastic products.

ISLAMIC INSTITUTE CONDUCTS STUDIES

Jiddah ARAB NEWS in English 11 Jul 82 p 3

[Article by Suresh Shah]

[Text] JEDDAH, July 10 — Work on seven out of 10 research projects planned for the year has been initiated by the Islamic Research and Training Institute (IRTI), according to Dr. Nevzat Yalcintas, chief professor for the IRTI Research Division. IRTI was established by the Islamic Development Bank (IDB) and has now been in operation for one year.

Dr. Yalcintas told *Arab News* Saturday that work on these short term research projects has been contracted with outside researchers and is expected to be completed within six months. Other projects are in the process of finalization.

Out of the seven contracted projects, three have been allocated to the researchers from King Abdul Aziz University (KAU) two to the researchers from Pakistan and one each from Turkey and West Germany.

A number of research projects are planned: economic cooperation among Islamic states will be studied by Prof. Dr. Sabahaddin Zaim of K.A.U.;

— Labor mobility and social integration among Islamic countries will be studied by Dr. Masudul Alam Choudhury of KAU;

— Savings and investment equilibrium in the Islamic framework is the topic of Prof. Dr. Ahmad Kilicbay of Istanbul University;

— Islamization of the Economy — a case study of Pakistan Institute of Policy Studies, Islamabad;

— An Islamic Critique of Securities Markets — their implication for Islamic Banks will be completed by Prof. Dr. M.A. Mannan of K.A.U.;

— Distribution of Benefits of Economic Growth in Pakistan will be studied by Dr. G.B. Mujahid from Karachi; and

— The Intended Economic Integration of the Muslim World and the membership of Islamic countries in existing regional integration — some legal and economic problems, or liberalization of capital movements among Islamic countries: investment creation, investment diversion and trilateral cooperation by Dr. Volker Nienhaus of University of Bochum, West Germany.

In addition to this research work, the IRTI also proposes publication of three doctorate thesis under its program.

One expected from K.A.U. will be on Economic Thoughts in Ibn Taymiya; second will be on Economic Thought in Al Gazali by Dr. Sabri Orman from Faculty of Economics, Istanbul; and third on Economic Cooperation between Turkey and Middle East countries by Dr. Abdullah Gul from Department of Economics, Adepazari, Turkey.

CSO: 4400/421

HOUSING LOANS CEILING SET

Jiddah ARAB NEWS in English 28 Jul 82 p 2

[Text] JEDDAH, July 27 — The maximum limit for commercial real estate investment loans has been fixed at SR10 million, according to new regulations approved by Finance and National Economy Minister Muhammad Aba Al-Khail.

The Real Estate Development Fund, a state agency founded in 1974, devised new conditions for residential and office complexes for which it provides loans. These conditions include that a complex should comprise no less than 10 housing units, apartments or villas and the total area for the complex should not be less than 2,000 square meters. The fund provides interest-free medium and long-term loans for financing private sector investment.

According to *Al-Riyadh* newspaper Tuesday, loans should not be more than half the total cost for the project while maintaining the SR10 million maximum limit. The lower estimate, the owner's or the fund's is to be endorsed as the basis for granting the loan.

Under the new regulations, the fund will fund the loan in five, 20 percent installments over a period of less than 12 months. Borrowers should not begin construction work on the project until the credit facility agreement is signed with the fund. They also are required to present a mortgage only the project site and properties on it in the fund's favor as a guarantee for the loan.

The loan should be repaid in 10 annual installments, the first of which matures a year from the date of the project's completion according to the schedule approved by the fund. The loan can be canceled in case the applicant had provided incorrect information to the fund, deviated from the designs and specifications or did not fulfil one of the conditions including delay in repayment of any of the installments on due time. In such cases, the total amount of the loan becomes due immediately.

Apart from the normal safety measures, parking area, fire escape and elevators, specifications necessitate a recreation center for complexes of more than 25 housing units or 12 villas.

Al-Riyadh quoted an official as saying that provisions for special loans have not been changed. He stressed that new commercial investment loans regulations aim at maximum benefit from the credit facilities.

By the end of the Second Five-Year Development Plan (mid-1980), the Real estate development fund had disbursed more than SR33 billion in loans to the private sector. For the Third Five-Year-Plan, SR20 billion has been allocated for all housing projects. This provides for the construction of 267,000 housing units, of which 181,000 will be private sector projects.

CSO: 4400/4241

NEW LITERACY PLAN ENFORCED

Jiddah ARAB NEWS in English 11 Jul 82 p 3

[Text]

RIYADH, July 10 (SPA) — Education Minister Dr. Abdul Aziz Al-Khuwaiter Saturday instructed the implementation of a new policy for eradication of illiteracy and to provide adult education. The new program will apply, as of the 1982-83 academic year, on the first year of literacy night schools.

The new policy will cut back the four-year period of adult education to only two, equipping students with a minimum ability to read, write and calculate.

The second, third and fourth years are going to proceed, however, under the former program with the last students graduating by the end of 1984-85.

The minister requested that all regional directorates follow up the new policy for adult education and literacy by recruiting efficient teachers, making periodical evaluations and preparing detailed reports with comments from each directorate.

In another development, the secondary postal institute of Dammam began Saturday receiving applications for enrolment for holders of intermediate school certificates. Aug. 4 has been fixed as the final date for receiving applications and study is expected to begin Oct. 3.

Conditions for admission include that the applicant should be Saudi Arabian, possess an intermediate school certificate and be in the age group of 14 to 25. During the three-year course, students are granted SR675 monthly in addition to being provided with books, transport and accommodation for those coming from outside Dammam. Upon graduation, the students have the option to be appointed, sent abroad on a scholarship or pursue education at university level.

Meanwhile, thirty-nine persons have applied for two courses for laboratory experts and education technology to be organized by King Saud University's College of Education in the upcoming academic year. The Ministry of Education has requested regional directorates to release the nominees in time to join the two courses. The first course is to be enrolled in by 27 persons and the second 12.

CSO: 4400/421

BRIEFS

STUDENT VISIT PROGRAM SET--RIYADH, July 5 (SPA)--An internal visits program for students, sponsored by five summer centers in Taif, Baha, Abha, Dammam and Hail, will begin July 31, it was reported Monday. Students are scheduled to spend seven days in each towns. The program has been allocated SR800,045 in this year's budget. The first trip begins July 31, followed by the second Aug. 7, the third Aug. 14, the fourth Aug. 21 and the fifth Aug. 28. A total of 1,500 students will participate in the program--300 pupils for each trip. As the students come from various parts of the Kingdom, regional education departments will provide transport for their participants to and from the visiting centers. The program aims at acquainting students to various parts of their country to inspect the development witnessed by the Kingdom. [Text] [Jiddah ARAB NEWS in English 6 Jul 82 p 3]

CSO: 4400/420

GOVERNOR OF KORDOFAN DISCUSSES RELATIONSHIP WITH CENTRAL GOVERNMENT

Khartoum AL-AYYAM in Arabic 29 Jun 82 pp 4, 5

[Interview with Al-Fatih Bisharah by Hamdi Badr-al-Din: "Our Masses Understand the Goals and Concerns of the Regional Government"; date and place not specified]

[Text] AL-AYYAM, in coordination with the political section of the television [department], is hereby publishing the text of the conversation our colleague Hamdi Badr-al-Din held with Mr al-Fatih Bisharah, governor of the Kordofan Province, on the occasion of the country's celebrations of Decentralization Day.

Hamdi Badr-al-Din:

By holding the recent elections, the May revolution has been carrying out the latest stage of regional government, delivering complete authority to its masses, who have stood and will always stand along the road to May.

Before that, there was a transitional stage, and before that in turn there also were the first signs of regional government, which was proclaimed on 9 June and was a real beginning of decentralization in the Sudan.

In reality, the transitional experiment was fruitful and it produced great results in the context of democracy and the exercise of political action arising from the goals and the charter of the great May revolution.

The experiment you have engaged in in the transitional period, passing through the stages of regional government and decentralization, must have shown you many opinions related to the notion of regional government and decentralization in the Sudan.

We would like to become apprised of this achievement.

Al-Fatih Bisharah:

The transitional period was rich in self-sacrifice and accomplishments. It laid specific tasks on the shoulders of us provincial governors; these were represented by the establishment and training of regional governments consisting of ministries, leadership personnel and intermediary and base personnel in addition to statutes, frameworks, bills and laws for the executive authority in the provinces.

This was achieved, thanks be to God, in record time. It was then our duty to work to establish the provincial people's assembly, and we did that also, by supervising the elections, which took place in a free, proper manner. We also established the secretariat and created headquarters and the preliminary bill.

[Words missing] our duty also in spreading about local rule by the people under the guidance [words missing] we also did this by establishing nine regional councils with their own chambers, budgets and authorities. These in turn also established base councils in the towns, villages and units.

Hamdi Badr-al-Din:

You have talked of two points, through which we can sense the extent to which regional government has been effective:

1. As regards the formation of the regional government and departments.
2. As regards the bills regulating this government.

There is a situation which may seem strange to people, perhaps even in practice; if we say that there have been appointments or loans of personnel from the ministries and central organizations to the provincial government, does the provincial governor have jurisdiction over the promotions or issues regarding this personnel?

Al-Fatih Bisharah:

One should think that during the initial activity of establishing any provincial government, the provincial government must borrow its staffs from the central government. There are two types of personnel in the provinces: regional staffs, which we have acquired in accordance with the local government law, and staffs which have been appointed to us by the central authority. However, their provincial promotion is our area of specialization, is temporary, and does not affect the seniority of appointed officials in the general list at all.

This stage ended with the end of the transitional period. With God's permission, there will be no appointed persons in the next period; rather, all employees will be basically subordinate to the regional executive power, except for people who are basically in nationwide facilities such as the electric and water utilities. We have no power over them, except that we are delegated by the nationwide authority.

Hamdi Badr-al-Din:

Does that mean that the province has capable personnel whom it is able to provide?

Al-Fatih Bisharah:

Kordofan is a province that attracts people rather than driving them away, and we have no deficiency in personnel, except in the case of nationwide facilities.

This may be explained by the fact that the national authorities themselves have deficiencies in this sort of staff because of emigration and the enticements offered them by oil countries. However, aside from that, we have personnel at hand in the form of administrators, doctors and so forth.

Hamdi Badr-al-Din:

What is the relationship between the government and the governor and the people's assembly? Is there an atmosphere of reconciliation in this relationship?

Al-Fatih Bisharah:

I can truthfully state that we are working as one team, and the proof of that is the latest elections, since it absolutely did not happen that every minister proceeded to nominate himself--rather, we were all in control of our organizational institutions, and our nominations emerged from the political agencies at the provincial, departmental and area levels. If this shows anything, it shows the smooth coordination in the provincial government of Kordofan. All the ambassadors and international figures who have visited us have given us testimonials on that and have observed this smooth coordination.

In the joint meetings, we always reach agreement and carry out discussions on the leading issues of concern to the province. Our assembly has been the best of help; it has not been destructive or aggressive toward the government's mistakes. Rather, it revealed the mistakes for the sake of corrective constructive self-criticism and contributed ideas, guidance and different views of matters to the government in all its projects. Therefore, there has been obvious coordination, and the proof of that is the testimonial we have received from our assembly. By that I mean that I have made three statements, all of which were approved unanimously, and the ministers have made many statements which were also approved unanimously.

Even in the elections, the assembly's position was honorable; its statements were not fragmented and it absolutely did not go against what was required during this stage.

Hamdi Badr-al-Din:

There is no doubt that the elections which took place, which resulted in the selection of a governor, engendered a kind of movement in the provinces and an active political spirit which could reach the point of stimulus.

However, there were some questions. All the provinces declared their candidates on the same day, except Kordofan, which delayed its declaration a day. What is your opinion and your evaluation of the situation regarding the elections and the points they brought out?

Al-Fatih Bisharah:

One of the most important characteristics of the elections is that they proved that our masses are in a good state, because of their total comprehension of the

essence, goals and significance of local government. Proof of that is their rejection of all cries calling for tribalism, factionalism or the forming of groups, whatever the inspiration might be, except for the grouping of May, the rule of order, and allegiance to the constitution and the presidential republic.

The masses have rejected all appeals demanding apostasy, discrimination, eras of ignorance, and the fragmentation of the people. They have risen above all that and have brought forward men who have raised the slogan of order. Their tribe has been the Sudan and their policy a single political organization, the alliance of the forces of the working people.

In my opinion, this is the greatest feature of the elections.

As regards the delay in results, in reality there was absolutely no delay at all. Our brother Dr 'Awn al-Sharif, the chairman of the supervisory committee, declared, before everything else, after the message by the president and commander, Ja'far Numayri, had been read out, that the committee had decided to declare the results of the voting process at 1000 hours the following morning.

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CSO: 4504/410

ISLAMIZATION OF BANKING SYSTEM TO BE STUDIED

London ARABIA in English No 12, Aug 82 p 50

[Text]

Sudan is to study ways of Islamising its entire banking system. Plans for the study, to be carried out during the current financial year (1982-3) which began in July, were announced by the minister of finance and national planning, Ibrahim Mansour, in a speech presenting the 1982-3 budget to the People's Assembly. The aim of the study, which has been given the go-ahead by President Numeiri, is to see how banking in Sudan can be conducted in accordance with Islamic teaching without upsetting the country's financial situation.

While the study is going on the government plans to take various steps in this direction, such as setting up an interest-free banking unit within each commercial bank. At the same time the central bank, the Bank of Sudan, and the commercial banks will be called upon to establish a purely Islamic bank.

Mansour, himself one of the driving forces behind one of Sudan's newly-licensed but not-yet-operative Islamic banks, the Islamic Bank of Western Sudan, made extensive reference to the subject of Islamic banking in his speech, as part of a general announcement that measures were being taken to review the relationship between the Bank of Sudan and the various commercial banks.

All banks in Sudan were nationalised from 1970 until 1975, at which point foreign banks were encouraged to open offices in the country as part of a new open-door economic policy. The government is now thought to be less than satisfied with the role the foreign banks have played. Mansour, informing the People's Assembly that foreign exchange problems had increased, said a new banking law would be drafted and submitted to the Assembly for approval.

He went on to point out that the Sudanese government has already taken steps to stop interest charges at the specialised government-owned banks, including the Agricultural Bank and the Industrial Bank. Mansour indicated that Sudan wanted to work towards the renaissance of Islamic financial institutions. "We believe in their objectives and support them," he said. "We are studying the possibility of giving them special assistance so as to become stronger and stronger and eventually become the standard-bearers of Islamic financial dealings in Sudan." Exactly what form this support would take Mansour did not say.

Interest in setting up Islamic banks in Sudan has been strong for some time: in addition to the Faisal Islamic Bank of Sudan, which has been operating since 1978, applications for three others – the Gezira Bank, the Islamic Bank for Western Sudan and the Islamic Solidarity Bank – have been pending since last year. Abdel Rahim Hamdi, deputy general manager of the Faisal Islamic Bank of Sudan (FIBS) told *Arabia* that Mansour's own commitment to the Islamisation of the banking system was significant in itself. Hamdi also stressed that Mansour's budget speech was the government's first public statement on the matter. Special facilities had been given to FIBS when it began operations in May 1978, but these had subsequently been refused to

other would-be Islamic banks by Mansour's predecessor, Badr el din Suleiman.

Partisans of the Islamic banking movement in Sudan, who include several senior banking figures, are now waiting for concrete steps to be taken. Before the budget speech the Bank of Sudan had sent circulars to the state-owned commercial banks allowing them to open branches according to the "Faisal formula," but according to Hamdi only the Estate Bank has gone so far as to form a committee to discuss the policy in depth.

Discussions centre on whether to favour the establishment of Islamic branches along the lines of the policy now gradually being adopted by Egypt's Misr Bank, or whether to institute a system of profit-and-loss sharing counters at conventional banks, as is the case in Pakistan. Many bankers, including supporters of Islamic banking, object to the latter system on technical grounds, but there are also likely to be moral objections from customers who reject the double standards approach.

One plan put forward in the budget speech was for banks to pool together to set up an Islamic bank. This will clearly be one of the main proposals to be examined in the forthcoming study commissioned by Numeiri. But the big questions that remain include those of raising capital and overcoming the opposition of those bankers who object to the way Islamic banking already operates in Sudan. In any event it looks as though the process will be a gradual one.

CSO: 4500/271

BOOK ON WEST AFRICAN IMMIGRANTS REVIEWED

London WEST AFRICA in English No 3392, 9 Aug 82 pp 2043, 2044

[Text] Michael Wolfers looks at the long-standing flow of West African migrants into Sudan, and how this has affected the character of the area.

LEGEND IN SUDAN has it that Hamani Diori, as President of Niger on an official visit, was taken to see the vast cotton irrigation scheme at Gezira; from the crowd of peasant farmers, there stepped out a man from Niger who greeted the visitor rapturously and asked what had become of his brother since he himself had left home thirty years earlier on pilgrimage to Mecca. True or false, the story encapsulates the fate of hundreds of thousands of West African Moslems who have travelled eastwards ostensibly for the *haji* and reached no further than the Nile valley.

In the Middle East the term *Takarir* is used for the black people of West Africa and the Chad basin who have been travelling on pilgrimage over the centuries and for their descendants who have settled in many countries on the traditional land and sea routes. In Sudan such people are commonly known as *Fellata*; this term which was the Kanuri name for the Fulani was once used in a narrow and descriptive sense, but was later applied to all settlers in Sudan of West African origin and given derogatory connotation. The 'Westerners', as they were also called, comprised Fulani and Hausa from Nigeria, and immigrants from areas to the north and west of modern Nigeria; some sources indicate a link between *Takarir* and the ancient Kingdom of Takrur on the Senegal basin.

The flow of West African migrants into Sudan has been so long-standing and so intensive as to raise the possibility that a majority of the Sudanese people are of West African origin, and with antecedents in that region in the twentieth century. The true scale of population movement is difficult to assess, as for a variety of social and economic reasons those with *Fellata* background have tended to conceal it, but Sudan has seen rapid population growth in this century which was indicative of substantial immigration. Under colonialism and since independence in 1956 Sudan has generally been open and receptive to newcomers and refugees. From a population of under 2 million at the start of the century, the number rose to more than 10 million at independence. The 1956 census showed an estimated 500,000 Westerners, of Nigerian origin or from former French colonies, but this is a substantial under-estimate.

A critical appraisal of the 1956 census was included in a major study of pre-independence migration policies by a Sudanese scholar, G. Ayoub Balamoan, whose work first published in 1976 has now been revised and extended.* Although the census showed West Africans as making up 8.8 per cent of the population of Sudan, Balamoan's hypothesis, backed by a mass of statistical evidence, was that "at least

*G. Ayoub Balamoan. *Peoples and Economics in the Sudan: 1884-1956* (Harvard University Center for Population Studies. \$25).

one-half of the population of the Sudan in 1956 were themselves immigrants from West Africa, or their parents had migrated into the Sudan after the end of the Mahdist regime in 1899." If his extrapolations must be treated with caution, the indications are persuasive of a pattern of one-way migration of what he calls Congo-Chad-Niger people.

Connections with Nigeria

Nigerians are an important part of the Westerner community in Sudan, although the modern shift of pilgrims from overland to air transport routes has reduced the flow and Nigeria's own wealth from oil is more than a counter to the labour demand from Sudan's agro industry. The historical connections between Nigeria and Sudan were spelled out in detail in a major work published in 1972 by the Sudanese historian, Umar Al-Naqar, *The Pilgrimage Tradition in West Africa*. He showed how the route through the Sudan became more attractive than the harsher journey across the Sahara desert, even though the latter provided an overland camel route to the Hijaz rather than the need to find passage money across the Red Sea. For pilgrims in the days before air travel, the *hijra* was a leisurely affair and for foot pilgrims an undertaking that took years.

In such a time-scale the distinction between pilgrimage and migration became blurred, as the journey was continued in rhythm with harvest seasons and casual labour opportunities on the way. Al-Naqar remarks: "The establishment of the Gezira cotton scheme in 1925 provided additional incentive to West African Muslims, who with no urgency would travel along providing labour and hope eventually to make the pilgrimage! The early settlers from West Africa who had trickled into Sudan from the seventeenth century were deeply assimilated by the end of the nineteenth century. The colonial period provoked migration on a bigger scale, and it is the hundreds of thousands who moved in this century that form the content of Balamoan's study; for many of them the attraction was not Mecca but the news that "in the Nile Valley there was work, land, water and even hard-cash." It was British colonial policy in Sudan to encourage the migration of Nigerians to provide labour for Gezira and similar agricultural schemes.

Balamoan suggests that to relieve the labour shortage in Sudan and in response to British policy of giving immigrants title to land after five years of continuous possession, the inflow of workers and their families from West Africa was at the rate of 125,000 each year from 1901 throughout much of the century. The human side of these statistics is shown in a recent micro-study by Mark Duffield of Maiurno, near Sennar, which was established as a Nigerian settlement in 1906.[†] The displacement of Sokoto Fulani had less to do with the *hijra*, than with the *hijra*, a religiously ordained flight, induced in this case by British colonial expansion in northern Nigeria. British military occupation of Sokoto led to the flight of the Caliph Attahiru, and the installation in 1903 of Sultan Attahiru II by Lugard, but the Caliph declined to live with the infidels and he died bravely at the second battle of Burmi in July 1903 (the story of Attahiru's determined resistance to the garrison troops of Captain Sword and the West African Frontier Force is well told in R. A. Adeleye's *Power and Diplomacy in Northern Nigeria 1804-1906*).

The Sokoto Fulani, who had a legend predicting their *hijra*, joined the Caliph's fifth son, Muhammad Bello or Mai Wurno, in a migration that may have had Mecca as its original target. Mai Wurno's group moved at the leisurely pace of the previous century, and appeared to be looking for a place to settle — one of their hosts, the Sultan of Dar Sila (in modern Chad) was said to have hurried them on "after a stay of two years" according to Al-Naqar's informants. Mai Wurno was offered land in

[†]Mark R. Duffield, *Maiurno: capitalism and rural life in Sudan* (Ithaca Press, £12.50).

Sudan near an earlier Fulani settlement close to Sennar. From 1906 Maiurno attracted Fulani and Hausa settlers, although in 1930 province boundaries were arranged so that Mai Wurno, who had been incorporated as an official into Sudan native administration, should not have jurisdiction over a longer settled Fulani and Hausa community near Singa.

Duffield documents the growth of the Maiurno settlement until the late 1970s, and he notes that the building of the new surfaced road along the Blue Nile south from Wad Medni to Demazin will speed up labour migration from Maiurno to the larger urban centres along the river, including the capital, Khartoum. He makes clear that the Nigerian settlement on the Blue Nile was encouraged by the colonial authorities, and his information confirms some of Balamoan's broader arguments. Suffield sees the British as welcoming the conservatism of the Nigerian settlers as a support to the Sudan "traditional" élites whom Britain also preferred to the modernising elements that would press nationalist demands.

West African traders

Although there has been much inter-marriage between Nigerian settlers and Sudanese of other stock, the Westerner element can still be clearly distinguished in Sudanese small towns. In El Obeid, for example, which is the crossing point for two of the old Sudan pilgrimage routes, the traveller today will find a quarter of petty traders with strong West African traditions and a distinct personality. West African traders are conspicuous in at least two major street markets around the capital, one of the outskirts of Khartoum and another on the edge of Omdurman (at chance encounters recently at the latter I bought tea from a woman who had migrated overland from Mauritania eighteen years before and clothes from more recent arrivals from Chad who spoke French in preference to Arabic).

In contemporary Sudan some observers interpret President Gaafar Nimeiri's ready welcome for African immigrants (despite an economic pressure they can represent) as part of a deliberate process of depoliticising the Sudan. Certainly the immigrant community have not pressed for a voice in the political process commensurate with their numbers and with the contribution they have made. George Balamoan writes with almost an alarmist note about policies that have encouraged West Africans to Sudan in preference to Egyptians from further north in the Nile valley. He concludes that Sudan has not yet become a nation but "will probably become a nation predominantly West African in character and population." He describes this as a case of the immigrant not being swallowed up by his new country but in his swallowing it. Perhaps it is all to the good that Nigeria, Africa's largest country in population, has been able to share some of its people with Sudan, Africa's largest country in size.

CSO: 4500/271

POPULAR UNITY MOVEMENT CRITICIZES GOVERNMENT POLICIES

Tunis AL-RA'Y in Arabic 4 Jun 82 p 4

[Article: "List From National Council of Popular Unity Movement"]

[Text] The National Council of the Popular Unity Movement [MUP], convening in Tunis, the capital, on Sunday, 23 May 1982,

After evaluating the current conditions in Tunisia and reviewing the various problems projected at the national and external levels,

Asserts that the general situation in the country is reflected in the following manifestations:

1. In the Political Sphere:

The regime persists in its policy of intensifying oppression and of suppressing liberties. While claiming to be open and democratic, the regime continues to reject the popular demand embodied in legislative amnesty.

2. In the Economic Sphere:

The regime exploits all propaganda means in the interest of a sixth plan, which it has begun to implement before any "consultation" or "legislative approval."

It is a plan that seeks fundamentally to starve and impoverish the masses, to spread ignorance and unemployment and to serve bourgeois interests. Moreover, foreign capital has infiltrated our country and dominates the agricultural sector. This is in addition to the negligence and the exploitation from which the small farmers suffer.

3. In the Social Sphere:

The regime is intensifying its maneuvers against the popular organization, thus trying to either subject the organization leaders to its will or to divide the organization's ranks.

4. In the Cultural and Educational Sphere:

The regime continues its disavowal of the cultural traditions of our people, is destroying the people's unity with intellectual distortion and oppression and is persistently backing down on spreading education and making it compulsory. The regime resorts to making numerous changes in the educational programs without any consultation and insists on turning the fundamental role of educators into a marginal role. It even insists on crushing their legitimate professional, material and moral rights.

5. In the Sphere of Foreign Relations:

The regime has chosen to throw itself openly in the bosom of the imperialist forces. Perhaps the most evident and latest example of this is the weapons deal concluded with the United States of America. This deal is considered a direct danger that denies the people enormous resources that would be better spent on development, not to mention the serious danger found in the possibility that these weapons might be used against the popular masses.

The National Council believes that general conditions in the country have reached such a degree of danger that the country is ready for a new form of direct colonialism.

The National Council believes that the country is in the abyss of deterioration to such a degree that the solutions must be radical and decisive. Therefore, the MUP believes that the sound solution to Tunisia's problems is embodied in the following:

1. In the Political Sphere:

Continued struggle and consolidated popular action are the means to true democracy and public liberties and the means of attaining the following fundamental goals:

- A. General legislative amnesty and the release of all political prisoners.
- B. Abolition of oppressive laws that are in violation of the simplest concepts of democracy, especially the associations law, the press law and the strike law.

2. In the Economic Sphere:

Continued struggle and mobilization of the popular masses so that they can dictate a fundamental retreat from the economic options imposed on them; efforts to build a socialist society free of all forms of class exploitation and of the excessive enrichment of the lucky few at the expense of the masses; and coordinated struggle with the small farmers so that they can force a reform of their deteriorating conditions and contribute to the adoption of an agricultural policy that serves the national interests and the interests of the small farmers.

3. In the Social Sphere:

Greater vigilance to confront any maneuver aimed against the unity of the working class and the independence of its unionist organization. On this occasion, the National Council greets the valiant struggle being waged by the workers, be they in the education sector or other sectors, despite all the obstacles. The council also denounces the recent hikes in some prices.

4. In the Cultural and Educational Sphere:

Encouragement of the intellectual and artistic efforts of men of culture enabling them to contribute to laying down the foundations of a popular culture compatible with the aspirations of the masses.

Support and backing of educators in their struggle for their legitimate rights and for restoring their usurped rights, enabling them to undertake their natural role in establishing and implementing an educational policy that seeks fundamentally to achieve a just socialist society.

5. In the Sphere of Foreign Relations:

Denunciation of the policy of excessive armament and struggle for reconsideration of the current defense policy and of the deteriorating relations between the present regime and the neighboring fraternal countries, as well as for reliance on an intrinsic defense policy in which the popular forces play a fundamental role.

The MUP also stresses that the current regime shoulders full responsibility for these deteriorating conditions by insisting on its petrified positions despite society's development. This regime clings to power against the will of the masses and despite the tragedies and dangers it has created. It is freezing the political and intellectual life, and it persists in its class-oriented and selective economic, social and educational approaches.

While denying the opposition political movement its right to exist legally and to convey its voice to public opinion, except on conditions acceptable to it, the present regime insists on confirming before the popular masses and before history that it alone shoulders responsibility.

Statement Regarding Talah and Al Haouareb Incidents

The Political Bureau of the MUP has issued the following statement on the incidents that took place in Talah and 'Ayn al-Bayda':

The Political Bureau considers the incidents that have taken place in Talah Delegation as nothing but a new proof and an inevitable reflection of the bankruptcy of the basically faulty and intransigent economic, social and political actions that strengthen the class and provincial differences in the country.

It believes that the reaction of Talah citizens is normal, considering that the suppression of wrath on the one hand and false promises on the other are

no longer possible in an area where production relations are subject to feudalism in its true sense and where major landowners monopolize the positions of influence to serve their private interests.

The bureau also points out that 'Ayn al-Bayda' incidents are similar to other recurrent incidents in which the blood of Tunisians has been shed with the approval of the present Tunisian regime and as a result of its class actions, which are hostile to the masses, and its disregard for the citizens' wishes and as a result of the absence of any real popular consultation.

The Political Bureau expresses its sympathy for Talah citizens and for Al Haouareb citizens in their efforts to overcome their worsening conditions and condemns the oppressive reaction on the part of the regime.

Considering that the incidents taking place in the Tunisian society reflect the false claims regarding superficial consultations on a so-called plan, the MUP denounces the obvious contradiction between the regime's actions and statements and calls for action to turn the country's economic and political life into a democratic one so that opportunism and exploitation disappear.

The movement reaffirms that sound solutions are embodied basically in the formulation of a comprehensive development plan that changes conditions fundamentally on the bases of changing production relations and methods so that individual and class differences are eliminated.

8494

CSO: 4504/377

TUNISIA

ISLAMIC TENDENCY MOVEMENT CRITICIZES OPPRESSIVE GOVERNMENT ACTIONS

Tunis AL-RA'Y in Arabic 4 Jun 82 p 4

[Article: "Statement From Islamic Tendency Movement [MTI] on Occasion of First Anniversary of Its Founding"]

[Text] In the name of God, the merciful and the compassionate,

The Islamic Tendency Movement, as a political party that works and struggles to secure political liberties, to achieve social justice and to enable the masses to restore their right to make decisions, derives its legitimacy from its cultural and historical aspects and its broad popular base.

In view of the regime's failure to provide the means for comprehensive growth and in view of the continued presence of the causes of political, economic and cultural backwardness, causes embodied basically in:

The monolithic nature of the ruling political tendency (Destourian Party) and its domination of mass establishments and organizations,

The fundamental contradiction between the masses' aspirations and ambitions on the one hand and the regime's policies tied to the interests of the Western imperialist forces on the other hand,

In view of this, the Islamic Tendency Movement considers it its duty to intensify its struggle for the true liberation of the country and to shoulder its divine and patriotic responsibility for mobilizing the masses and devoting their capabilities and resources and organizing and employing them to serve our people's causes.

The regime's tendency to liquidate the movement through its propaganda and political campaigns, through the oppressive and terroristic actions in which it has engaged against broad sectors of the movement's strugglers and through the confiscation of the movement's papers and the banning of its teachings and the subsequent attacks, torture, rigged trials and harsh sentences has been evident since the outset of 1981.

"Do you think you will enter heaven? God knows who the strugglers among you are and knows those who endure patiently."

Through all this, the ruling party has sought to entrench oppression and subservience and to confront the liberationist tide of the masses of our Muslim people.

But all this, and even more, cannot obstruct our people's march toward unity and self-determination. God willing, the movement will continue to confront all kinds of persecution and tyranny:

"...Men said to them: 'A great army is gathering against you': And frightened them: But it (only) increased their faith: they said: 'For us God sufficeth, and He is the best disposer of affairs.' And they returned with grace and bounty from God: no harm ever touched them." Qur'an III, 173, 174

The movement will remain loyal to what its constituent declaration has stated, namely, that there is no custodianship over Islam and no resorting to masked political dialogue. It will inevitably achieve its goals because it emanates from the masses and because it is essentially in conflict with all of the haughty and the rich.

Whereas the movement has chosen to establish the struggle on constitutional bases to settle the intellectual, cultural and political issues and whereas it has rejected violence as a means of change, the regime has insisted, by virtue of its nature, on following the path of oppression and suppression, accusing the movement of the acts of violence and torture that the regime itself has been committing.

This was revealed in the message sent by the lawyers to the Chamber of Deputies. The regime thus is trying to depict the issue as a criminal issue and to justify the detention and trial of the people involved, considering them common prisoners and not political prisoners even though all the political movements and the press are unanimous that the aim is to liquidate a political opponent.

The movement has adopted a comprehensive concept of Islam in which Islam "constitutes the ideological background from which emanate the various intellectual concepts and the political, economic and social courses that determine the identity of this movement and control its strategic tendencies and its specific positions." The regime has confronted the movement by raising the slogan of "separating the church from the state," thus seeking to reduce Islam to some rituals of worship while continuing to uproot our cultural mainstays, to secularize the country and to entrench imperialist domination and subservience to the West.

"Do you believe in parts of the book and disavow other parts? Whoever does this shall be punished with shame in this life and with the harshest torture in the hereafter." [loose translation of Koranic phrase]

Whereas the regime "has tried to make public opinion believe that the group [movement] has connections with some foreign countries," as the message of the lawyers to the members of the Chamber of Deputies says, this regime never stops serving the West's interests, bolstering the West's economic and military

domination and following a Westernized cultural and educational policy. What is more, the regime brags about strengthening the "friendly" relations with the United States, the enemy of the peoples, of Islam and of the Islamic movements in the world.

Finally, the movement pledges before God and its masses that it will march forth on the path it has charted for itself and will remain loyal to our people's aspirations and ambitions for freedom, justice and equality. The movement will do all it can so that "the masses can regain their legitimate right to determine their future in freedom from all internal custodianship or foreign domination."

The movement urges all of the Muslim masses and national opposition forces--the movement appreciates the support and solidarity these masses and forces have given it in its tribulation--to continue the struggle for a fundamental change in the authoritarian relations and for lifting the injustices committed against the Muslim leader and strugglers and against all those imprisoned and exiled because of their ideas through the issuance of a general legislative amnesty.

The movement also calls for considering the day of 6 June a day of solidarity with the Islamic Tendency Movement and urges the masses and the national forces to express their support for our just cause, which will triumph, God willing. "If you support God, He will support and strengthen you."

"O ye believers, respond to God and to His messenger if they call you to do that which redeems you."

God is great and thanks to be Him.

8494

CSO: 4504/377

MINISTER OF INTERIOR DISCUSSES DEVELOPMENT, REGIONAL IMBALANCE

Tunis LE TEMPS in French 3, 4 Jul 82

[Interview with Minister of Interior Driss Guiga, by Mustapha Khammari]

[3 Jul 82 pp 2-3]

[Text] Twenty-six years after the country's independence, the regions of Tunisia are characterized by two phenomena: regional imbalances and the inadequacy of administrative structures.

The regional imbalances are the result of a number of factors, mainly the aftereffects of the protectorate, but also of a centralist socioeconomic policy that the government has tried since 1973 -- the date on which the rural development program was launched -- to correct, or at least reduce.

This program of regional development and rural advancement has often been criticized for its flaws that became apparent in practice. Consequently, deputies requesting its evaluation and modification (December 1981) -- which many citizens claim is a mere palliative measure -- now agree in suggesting a search for a more wide-ranging and more integrated solution in order to achieve a real regional balance. This was the proposal for the economic regions, which was unfortunately buried before it was even born.

Related to the problem of regional balance, but also to the problem of administrative democracy and plain democracy is the problem of the regional administrative structures.

The consensus on this question is that the structures must be reorganized. Henceforth, the makeup of the governorate council is in question and the manner of appointing its members deemed undemocratic.

In addition, the problem of coordination between the various outside departments of the ministries and the governor does not seem to have been completely resolved.

Regarding the communes, the scarcity of human resources (competence) and financial means is a serious handicap for the development of their action.

All of these problems have drawn the attention of the government, particularly the Ministry of Interior, the department mainly concerned by any regional reform and responsible for carrying out government policy on the matter.

Feverish activity is underway in the ministry concerning the regions and Minister of Interior Driss Guiga is intensifying contacts with regions, while taking the pulse of the citizens to learn their concerns, especially in the poorer regions.

LE TEMPS asked the minister to review the situation for its readers and he willingly consented.

[Question] You have recently made a major effort to help the regions, especially the border and deprived areas. What is the direction of those efforts and what overall policy is being followed to develop these regions?

[Answer] First of all, I must tell you that the efforts we are making in the Ministry of Interior fit within the framework of the action planned by the government. On a regional and local level, we must carry out the policy decided on by the government and expressed in the annual economic budgets and the operating budgets. Actually, there is quite frequently a wide margin between the will expressed by the government, the planning itself and the actual situation because in order to carry out the projects, we need men and structures. Very often the structures are defective and our people do not have an adequate perception of the local situation. The task of the Ministry of Interior essentially consists of ensuring that what is formulated theoretically at the level of government policy, what is specifically formulated in economic and social objectives, is actually carried out in the field. That is the work of the Ministry of Interior, the work of the governors, the presidents of the municipalities and all local structures.

Bureaucratic Circuits

The efforts made are first of all manifested by the presence of governors, representatives and presidents of municipalities in areas where those efforts are needed, then by continuing action by the central directorates of the Ministry of Interior, by local visits, for example. We recently had a team from the Ministry of Interior, headed by Bechir Tounekti, director of communes, that went to the borders accompanied by a whole group of technicians from several ministries. The purpose was to study integrated development projects in border areas in the region of Jendouba, considered to be one of the least developed regions of Tunisia. Finally, since I am personally responsible in the field for execution of the government's development action, I aim my visits at areas where an effort must be made, in cities that have sufficiently developed cadres and structures as well as in underdeveloped regions. In the

governorates, the presence of the minister of interior is important and his impact on regional and local authority is just as important. By going to see them, by touring those regions, I bring the government's encouragement, I lend the credibility of the action announced by the government and I bring back to the government the impressions and real difficulties that I perceive. I recently visited the governorate of Kasserine, going specifically to the border areas. A few days ago, I visited one of the least developed parts of the governorate of Sfax. Almost purposely I did not go to the city itself. And that is what I am going to do in the future, to show that we are going there to work. The minister of interior does not go just to preside over ceremonies. We go to work, study and understand. In this connection, I would like to cite a typical example of what I observed during my last visit to Jebeniana, an example significant of the difficulty of taking action in the still undeveloped regions. You know that last year, the Chamber of Deputies passed a law encouraging the on-the-job training idea consisting of giving bonuses to enterprises that hire young graduates of technical schools in particular. We also passed a law making it possible to give aid to young graduates who want to start an enterprise. The work done in Jebeniana, El Hancha and Menzel Chaker was simple and precise. We asked ourselves the question of how much of those two laws we had applied in the region. I must admit that the result was disappointing. Dossiers were put together, but it is difficult to find the persons involved and convince them. Those dossiers are still sitting somewhere in the bureaucratic machinery of the administration. I would not like to pass a negative judgment on the administrative machinery, but I must say that that is the administrative situation, the situation of those who handle the dossiers, who make decisions in a given ministry far from local life and who require citizens living under difficult conditions, far from any real information, to fill out forms, for example, to present papers whose meaning they do not even understand. Here you have the main task of the Ministry of Interior. We must admit and explain that despite our declared intention to help these young people, to make a whole structure available to them, we are not succeeding in helping them. At least, that is what I observed in Jebeniana, El Hajeb and Menzel Chaker. This means that the same situation exists elsewhere. That is the type of action which the Ministry of Interior must take, that the minister of interior in person must take, for it is a matter of making the government aware, of making the prime minister and president themselves see these problems. I could cite more examples of this same type, particularly land problems that are difficult to solve and that sometimes constitute bottlenecks for any action of developing agriculture. I saw land problems that go back 30 or 40 years and that cannot yet be solved. We are also facing problems of local organization that are just as difficult to solve. The problem now is knowing how to proceed so that a progressive policy like that of the Tunisian Government becomes a practical reality in all underdeveloped regions.

[Question] That is the subject of the second question. During one of your visits to the interior, you emphasized that the political determination to develop the regions exists, but one can nevertheless observe, as you have stressed, that the administration does not follow. How do you plan to remedy this deficiency?

[Answer] I would like to make one remark about the word "deficiency." I do not believe that there is any deficiency in the Tunisian administration or in the structures for public action. Rather, it is a matter of an inadequate perception of the situation. For example, at the time of the visit of the commission headed by the director of communes to the western border regions, it took a great deal of time to convince administrative officials to go with the commission. Those officials did not understand very well the usefulness of going to the borders in practically isolated regions. Given the laws and the structures, we could, they thought, carry out any integrated project for the benefit of a given place without being forced to see the real situation. They had to be convinced to go. And after the first impression we had, those officials understood. They saw a reality different from what they had imagined. Because the mistake of the administration and the mistake of any purely theoretical organization is to define a framework and want the people to fit into it. But there is a real situation that must be taken into account: the people as they are.

New Perception

This perception has improved by the effort we are making with upper-level personnel in the Tunisian administration to persuade them to participate in integrated, common action. For our part, we hope that this is the role that will be played by the Regional Development Commission, a new institution set up within the Ministry of Planning. We hope that this commission will be a unit of action and coordination, not at the level of theoretical planning, but on a practical level, in the field. What we are trying to do is to apply the model of developing deprived regions in specific places. Every two or three months, we will choose a region and subsequently see whether we are succeeding in solving problems. If we do succeed, there is no reason why that type of action cannot be initiated in other regions. It is through this pragmatic method that we could adapt ourselves to the real situation, even if it leads us to change laws.

[Question] Mr Minister, there is the problem of regional structures. These structures are the driving force that can help the development of underdeveloped areas. Do you not think that the regional structures now need some reorganization?

[Answer] I am personally convinced that Tunisia will not be able to move ahead positively and in the direction of overall progress in the years to come unless the regions, structures and people participating in the progress of these regions are given a new dimension, new responsibilities and a new participatory role. I believe that if we do not transfer the decision-making centers to the regional and local levels, we risk encountering obstacles in our action that we shall not be able to overcome.

In the past 20 years, Tunisia has made enormous progress in the area of organizing the government, with a centralized, structured administration that was indispensable to create rational action by the government. The regional administrative structures that we have had up to the present have given Tunisia a framework for management which, in my opinion, is excellent, despite

all the flaws, bureaucracy and certain negative routine aspects. The structure which Tunisia now has is certainly an excellent working tool. And yet, that working tool will be out of date if it is not changed. Until only a short time ago, all the structures of the Tunisian administration, all government structures for action, whether in a village in the far south or in Tunis, have had to await decisions from the center. Decisions have been made by the central government. All economic and social action is centralized and for a very simple reason, to wit, that Tunisia was not administered in terms of the Tunisian center. Under the protectorate, Tunisia was decentralized. The Tunisian administration turned to Paris for all its fundamental decisions. Tunis was just a relay station. We made enormous progress by making Tunis the decision-making center. Now, thanks to our centralizing action and the progress made, particularly in the training of upper-level personnel, action aimed at progress must be closer to the rank-and-file structures. It is no longer enough to make progress at the top. In order for that progress to be truly consolidated and not to remain the progress of one specific political, economic or social class or of a privileged elite, that progress must trickle down to the rank-and-file structures. In order for this to happen, we must absolutely shift decision-making centers. That is the decentralization of which we speak. It is not merely a matter of creating new directors' posts or new local administrations. That is not the problem. The problem of decentralization is actually a much deeper one. It consists of knowing how to transfer decision-making powers, obviously to the local level, using progressive techniques and in calculated phases. There can be no question of giving Metlaoui the right to decide what is going to happen in Tunis. But Metlaoui, Ghardimaou and Menzel Chaker must first of all learn to decide what must be settled as a local problem and what the people of Ghardimaou or Metlaoui or Menzel Chaker think must be done for them. How can we do this? In two ways: either the authoritarian way (with a representative or governor), which would change nothing, or the participatory way, meaning making structures responsible. I am deliberately avoiding the word "democracy" because I do not want to get into a sterile dispute over words that have no meaning or whose meaning the people do not understand. Making structures, cadres and the rank and file responsible: That is the goal we are pursuing and that is what will give a future responsible organization an extremely solid base. What happens at the top will then become secondary, for the people will then no longer fear controversies at the top. With respect to its rank-and-file structures, Tunisia will become as solid as the oldest Western democracies, in which countries continue to work, live, make decisions and operate no matter what kind of quarrels are going on at the top. That is the real work of consolidating a country that wants to base its freedom on reality. I would cite one example: At a discussion in Jebeniana concerning certain demands, I told the municipal officials: If your role as elected officials consists in presenting a list of demands and then waiting for the Ministry of Interior, the prime minister, the president of the republic or any other official in Tunis to make a decision in your favor or present you with a gift, and if you receive me so nicely in order to do so, through the Tabel, and so on, then there is no real progress, even if tomorrow I double your budget. Basically, there would be no progress because you would always be dependent on a decision that is not your own.

Local Responsibility

As long as rank-and-file structures depend on central decision-making, there can be no free structures in a country. If all structures depend on a final decision somewhere and nothing can be done or embarked upon by the community at the grassroots level, then no freedom is possible. The higher up decision-making is, the more information is minimalized and decisions will not be apt to be in keeping with local developments. In my opinion, it is toward local and regional responsibility that we must move. That will be the subject of a seminar of local communities around September. On that occasion, we intend to make great innovations in the vision we have of the role of these basic local structures: the delegations, municipalities, and so on. We intend to decentralize, essentially by giving each of the structures more authority, more possibilities of making decisions and giving all these structures elected councils chosen by the population.

However, the elections must not be an easy alibi enabling us to hold elections and thereby cloak ourselves in the disguise of respect for freedoms. There are many countries that always hold elections and that have never respected the freedoms of others. The essential thing is not only to have elections and elected officials. The essential thing is to make those elected officials responsible because they often try to duck their responsibilities, relying on their commune president or the president of the local council. What we want to do in the future is to set up, among other things, an elected council around the representative. The structure of the delegation will change. It will become a kind of rural commune managed by a local council whose representative (moatmed) will be the chairman for a certain length of time. However, the role of the council will not simply consist of presenting a list of demands to the representative, who will in turn present it to the governor, who will then present it to the minister of interior, who will pass it on to the government, for the council would then serve no purpose. It would perhaps only whet appetites and stir up political quarrels at the local level. This would cause people to waste time and would not lead to the democratization of national life in the real sense of the term, in the sense that in the long run would enable the Tunisian people to have internal structures strong enough to withstand all manner of difficulties. This is a very great ambition. It cannot be formulated in slogans. It is not a matter of slogans. I remain persuaded, for my part, that in order to prepare for a Tunisia of progress, of openness and freedom, it is not a matter of slogans, but of effective, efficacious work, work sometimes obscure and difficult exposing us to the lack of understanding even of those for whom we wish to do good things. Whatever the democratic structures and superstructures a country may have, if there is no democratic infrastructure, then there is no democracy and there is no free life. There is a very great difference between a country with democratic superstructures and a country with democratic infrastructures. If the democratic infrastructure exists, the superstructure is of little importance. And if the superstructures are democratic, they will succeed because they have the support of the people, because they are built on something solid. But if a country has democratic superstructures and not a democratic infrastructure, awaiting decisions from the superstructures, then there is no democracy. There is simply an organized struggle for

power, a kind of organized alternation in a sound complicity between certain political classes that end up by finding means of making arrangements among men. If one truly wants, as we do, to encourage means that can make democracy prosper in this country, if it is to be a democracy one day -- and this has never been seen in any Arab country -- then we must create the conditions for a grass-roots democracy. We must set up the proper infrastructures in order to give the democratic superstructures a chance to take root. Decisions must not come from above. We must learn, relearn democracy. Since Tunisia has never had a democracy, we must learn to make decisions come from the grass roots. Within this framework of action, for example, we are in the processing of encouraging the formation of associations of groups of people, but I do not believe that they have to be national. For example, one of the problems facing the proposed association of consumers is that it wants to be national from the very beginning. It is already tainted, in my opinion, and suspected of totalitarianism: people in Tunis trying to defend people buying fish in Nefta. The consumer problem is radically different from what it is in Tunis. We are willing to encourage local associations. Nefta consumers have specific problems. One could consider that the governorates of Tozeur and Kairouan have common problems, supply market problems. But the fact that one is proceeding from a central national structure is already a totalitarian position, when reality and the interests of the citizen dictate a different structure, one adapted to the grass roots. This type of association of groups defending interests and wanting to promote culture should do so at the local level. Moreover, our local culture is very rich. We should encourage it.

From the grouping of these local associations, one can create a whole. That is the theory of sets. Based on individual elements, one can create sets and not the opposite -- that is, based on a totalitarian point of view in order to impose arrangements on the pretext of working for the freedom of the people. That is contrary to the perception we have of the evolution of a society toward greater freedom, greater responsibility. I personally believe that it is worth the trouble to be done and tried and that at the present time, Tunisia has men and cadres determined to participate.

[4 Jul 82 pp 4-5]

[Text] The following is the second and last part of the interview with Driss Guiga (see yesterday's LE TEMPS).

[Question] Mr Minister, you say that the municipality of the unit of democratic apprenticeship. Within the framework of your plans, would one be right to expect a revision of the election code?

[Answer] We are going to propose to the government the revision of the municipal and local election law. I shall personally defend the idea that every electoral structure should have an electoral law. There is no reason why the electoral law of a municipality should be the same as the electoral law of the Chamber of Deputies and for a very simple reason: In the Chamber of Deputies, the elected official is considered to be a representative of the entire nation and we must be careful that no regional or provincial mentality develops in the mind of the national elected official. That is very important.

Every central assembly has this function of bringing the nation together as a unit. Based on differences, we must create an entity at a higher level. That is the role of the Chamber of Deputies. It is normal and desirable for a chamber of deputies to retain this national aspect, for a deputy from Kasserine or Sousse to pass laws that might displease the citizens of the regions that elected him. Or the law may not be in keeping with their interests. But a deputy is national, even if, for reasons of convenience, he is elected by regional structures.

In local life, it is completely different, first of all, because the municipalities are essentially administrative structures. The regional councils or, in the future, the councils of delegates will be administrative structures. Therefore, the political concern in the sense of exercising power should be more absent. When voters from Kelibia vote for their municipality or when Menzel Harb voters choose their council, they have specific concerns that are different from one another. How can one apply the same election standards to completely different situations? Why should the election system in Kelibia, which choose municipal elected official to take care of electricity in their region, roads, health, the market, supplies and so on, why should these structures be the same as the election of a deputy from Kelibia, who will represent the people of Kelibia in the National Assembly for national choices of domestic and foreign policy? What forces us to have the same election law? We must have an election law adapted to the needs and objectives we seek. And if we want to promote greater responsibility of these grass-roots structures, such as the municipalities, then we must draft a modified election law or find a formula adapted to these objectives of making municipal and local officials responsible. The same is true of regional elections. We must examine what objectives we are trying to achieve with the election law. That law is an instrument; it is not an end in itself. The election law must not be made an end in itself. The election law is an instrument, as representative as possible, for achieving specific objectives, in keeping with the public's interests. I therefore believe that we are going to present suggestions that we are perhaps going to submit to the seminar of which I spoke to you, a very important seminar that will be devoted to the democratization of local life, making Tunisia's grass-roots structures responsible. We will certainly have to modify the election law.

Central Technical Assistance Agency

[Question] Even if the will to act is not lacking, resources are sometimes inadequate and some credits are blocked, which hinders the action of municipalities. How do you expect to remedy this situation?

[Answer] First of all, it would be possible to change the tax law in order to create a new system of taxation in which the aspect of solidarity will be more present than it now is, and that solidary aspect will make it possible to finance the municipalities and areas that are the most disadvantaged today. We have done this, without changing the law, through concerted action for the past 2 years, action that has mainly involved small municipalities. This year, for example, all the small municipalities, those with a small budget, received a sum that was sometimes 100 or 200 percent of their normal

budget, while the large municipalities saw their government allocation drop substantially. This whole contribution has been oriented toward supporting the small municipalities. You will find it in the municipalities' budgets for 1981 and 1982. And we have now reached the situation where the small municipalities cannot use the aid that we have furnished them. That is why we have been thinking, among the projects we have in the Ministry of Interior, of turning the district of Tunis into central agencies to lend technical assistance to the small communes in order to carry out projects, complete studies, give them new possibilities and show them how to use their money, because they do not know or do not have the technical means to draft a plan. Since they do not have the means to pay upper-level personnel or engineers, as in the large cities, perhaps this district of Tunis will now evolve into a national agency of technical assistance to local structures, meaning the municipalities today and the councils of moatamdiat (delegations) in the future. That is one way of helping the small municipalities.

[Question] You have often spoken of the role of young people in the city. It is certain that the lack of projects, of aggressiveness, of municipalities and regional and local organizations frustrates young people, who find no outlet for their talents or anywhere to spend their time. What role will young people play in this program?

[Answer] Your question poses the problem of the participation of young people in local life. As you know, we recently organized a seminar on the life of young people in the city. We started from the idea that there is the problem of youth and the problems of young people. As far as we are concerned, we shall be content to solve the problems of young people, if we can. I believe that this would be one solution, a very positive contribution to the development of our young people. As for the major problem of youth, it will remain a metaphysical problem par excellence of all developing societies. We prefer, at least in the Ministry of Interior, not to get lost in very inspired, very philosophical, very metaphysical discussions on Youth with a capital Y. We have young people in our cities, in our villages and in the streets, young people with intellectual and cultural needs that are not those of their parents, that do not correspond to what is going on on television or radio, to the reality of their environment. They are sometimes in conflict with that environment. These are real problems. There is no miracle solution. There is one request that we have formulated to the different local structures, to join with the young people themselves and through the participation of those young people in solving specific problems in village X or Y. There are no set rules, no established methods. There is no program that we have invented. I prefer that the Ministry of Interior devote part of its subsidies to direct financing, upon the request of the local structures involved, of operations, whatever they may be, on the condition that those operations be requested by the local young people. I can very well envisage a municipal council holding an assembly in the town square with the young people, telling them: "Now then, we don't have much money to work with. What do you want us to do with it?" Some will want a library, others a mosque, others a stadium, and so on. That is where we must begin, learning the real needs of young people. That is what participatory life is. We must tell the young people of Herguela or Medjez-El-Bab that the municipality has so much money. The mayor must tell them: "I am not going to spend that

sum on building a sidewalk for my friend who has a cafe nearby. I will use it for the projects you want. Choose what you want to do with 5,000 dinars this year and if the project goes well, we will do something else with the 5,000 dinars next year."

We are willing to finance this program. The Ministry of Interior will devote credits to the purpose.

Interregional Imbalances

[Question] We should still like to talk about the regional imbalances which exist and which give rise to a feeling of frustration in the minds of the residents of deprived regions, for they see projects rapidly carried out in certain areas, the credits rapidly released, when for other regions representing the majority of the people, the same speed is not apparent.

What recently happened in Thala and in Ain El Beidha in Kairouan is perhaps the expression of that feeling of frustration. What do you think?

[Answer] As you have said, the imbalance or lack of balance is a concrete reality in all countries in the world. There is not a country in which there is mathematical equality between the different regions. The same is true in Tunisia. That is obvious. There is an inequality, a disparity, which is made up of two elements. The first is natural and is difficult to act upon. One cannot invent a sea in Kairouan. Nor can one invent the phosphate in the region of Gafsa and put it elsewhere. There are regions in which the climate is very hot and dry and where one cannot easily have irrigation.

In this disparity, there is consequently one part blocked that represents 50 percent. We can therefore act only on the remaining 50 percent. In that 50 percent, the political determination in Tunisia to create a balance, to move toward an equilibrium, is an undeniable reality. For me, the balance is not a static position, but rather, a dynamic position. One has but to look at the two sides of a scales on which you put no weight to see that they are never still. They are always moving. In other words, the balance is that effort, that tension to put things back in balance. Regional balance can only be a dynamic tension toward corrective actions. One cannot, at any given time, reach a balance for everyone. But the balance mainly consists in having a policy tending to give dynamic corrections for a situation in perpetual movement. From this standpoint, Tunisia is among the precursors. And at the beginning of independence, important decisions were made in our country thanks to -- we must admit this -- the intervention and personal boldness of President Bourguiba, decisions tending toward a regional balance. There were the great decisions concerning the Kasserine plant, the Beja sugar plant, the Menzel Bourguiba industrial center and the Gabes industrial development pole. In these four cases, the technical reports of the experts on industrialization had yielded negative conclusions. In these four cases, the government had received recommendations to make those investments elsewhere because they would be more profitable financially. According to the experts, El Fouledh should not have been put at Menzel-Bourguiba. The sugar plant should not have been set up in Beja, and so on. It was therefore a political

decision that was essentially aimed at giving economic possibilities to deprived regions or regions going through a major recession as the result of the departure of French troops from Gabes, for example, or of the French Navy from Menzel Bourguiba, leaving large numbers of persons unemployed. There was the decision to stabilize the nomads in Kasserine, for example. Before, Kasserine was not even a city, scarcely a village. It was a station through which wagons of alfalfa passed on their way to Sousse before being shipping to England. That was the situation of Kasserine 25 years ago: It was a desert. Now Kasserine is an industrial city. The same is true of Menzel Bourguiba and Gabes. What was there in Gabes except for henna and pomegranates? And there were 10,000 French soldiers who fed the population with their alms.

Today, Gabes is a major industrial compound in the Arab world. That is a fact written in the flesh and context of Tunisia, a reality that came about after independence. Consequently, the political determination to have a regional balance is a constant of this regime's policy.

At the present time, the speed of development has caused regions that have remained behind, that have not sufficiently developed, to have a more acute awareness because they now have more cadres. By way of example, I might tell you that Jebeniana, which I knew previous to 1956, was a hamlet. Its people spent six months of the year at Cap Bon. Beginning in June, they would go to Friguia, which was a *douar* [Bedouin camp]. Today Jebeniana has a coeducational lycee that graduates students with a greater awareness of the difference. Actually, what people now call "regional imbalance" is a more complete awareness of the difference, just as the Tunisian worker or cadre has a better understanding of the executive who has prospered very quickly and who has rapidly taken advantage of Tunisia's progress in order to enjoy a particularly prosperous situation. The Tunisian worker or cadre has himself benefited from that progress, but in comparison with those who have made more progress, he has a sharper sense of the difference, even though when one starts from scratch, I think there has been a fair evolution in both Jebeniana and Sfax. Naturally, from the purely mechanical or quantitative point of view, Jebeniana and Kasserine have registered greater progress than the region of Sfax. There were lycees in Sfax, but in Kasserine, there were not even any elementary schools before independence. Today, Kasserine has three lycees.

We are aware of that feeling of difference, not only between the social strata but between regions as well. But actually, it is by creating challenges that we will make progress. By admitting the relativity of the difference ourselves, by taking advantage of the relative function linking the difference, there is something to be done. That is the problem, because we believe that balance is a dynamic function. We cannot allow that feeling of differences to continue to exist.

How are we to proceed? First of all, I would like to say that along with that feeling of difference, there is another feeling, one of frustration with respect to the responsibilities being assumed by the regions. The people of Jebeniana would not like to feel that they are a satellite of the people of Sfax. Nor do the people of Metlaoui want to be a satellite of the people of

Gafsa, and so on. I said at the time of the vote on the Sixth Plan that the Tunisian regions and particularly the poorer ones must have some participation in the nation as a whole. The regions must not all have the feeling that they depend on a single place. Communications in Tunisia must not be aimed at a single point, but run in many directions. The regions must be given the feeling that the country needs them. The people of Gabes must need the people of Kef and at any given moment, Kef must have a national role to play. It must have a national vocation, whence our insistence that when a national company is to be set up in Gafsa, its officials must be in Gafsa. The chairman of the board must be there. There are at least three or four national offices which, as we have said, could easily be moved out of Tunis. We have the telex, aviation, dial telephones everywhere. There is no reason why the Oil Office should be in Tunis and not in an oil-producing region.

Actually, the quantitative efforts made are quite substantial, but the qualitative aspect is lacking; the aspect of participation. In the future, I hope that the chairman of the board of Sfax-Gafsa will be in Gafsa and I hope that the people who need Sfax-Gafsa will go to Gafsa. When the chairman of the board of the STB [Tunisian Banking Company] finally goes to Gafsa to deal with the president of Sfax-Gafsa and not the opposite, that will be a switch! This feeling of exclusion felt by certain regions will disappear.

Why not set up the Office of Tourism in Monastir? The SHTT [Tunisian Hotel and Tourist Company] is there and operating. There is more tourist travel to Monastir than to Tunis. The same is true of the Fishing Office. Why should it not be in Kelibia, for example, or in a place where people depend on fishing for a living? Tunisia actually draws its unity from the increasing number of its cities. By increasing their number, one achieves unity. By concentrating on a single center, one risks destroying all the others that are forced to stand back and watch. Why is the Mining Office in Tunis when all the mines are in the west? I can understand why this is the case of the Chamber of Deputies, of the Court of Appeals, but why the technical offices, especially when we now have decentralization of the university and of university graduates?

Furthermore, I believe that we should concern ourselves with aiming our action at the grass roots. And yet, we will not succeed, in my opinion, unless we provide possibilities of direct action for the grass roots. In the rural development program, we have added another 90 billion to solve the water problem. That program must not be given to SONEDE [National Water Exploitation and Distribution Company]. It should be given to the small local community. We must accustom local cadres and local structures to managing their own resources, to being responsible for them. But if directives are to come from the Ministry of Agriculture, Planning or Public Works, it will not work. In my opinion, we would not improve the living conditions of people at the local level.

At any rate, the Ministry of Interior has a development role far exceeding its role in ensuring security. It is, in fact, through development that one achieves the best possible security. We have a major role in development,

but we are nothing but its arms, the means by which development is executed. We are proud of that role in execution, for it is a particularly noble task making it possible to develop the entire territory of our nation.

11,464

CSO: 4519/254

BRIEFS

OIL, GAS RESERVES--Estimates of the oil reserves possessed by the UAE rose by 6.7 billion barrels between 1973 and the end of last year, when they stood at 32.2 billion bbl, it was reported recently from Abu Dhabi. Estimated gas reserves increased by over 200 billion cubic metres to 658.4 billion cubic metres. The report did not make it clear whether the higher estimates were primarily the result of new discoveries or were based on the application of more advanced technology for recovering oil and gas from known reserves. The UAE's oil production will last for more than 58 years, assuming that production remains at its present level of no more than 1.5 million b/d, an official in the UAE's Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources was quoted as saying. [Excerpt] [Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 26, 9 Aug 82 p 5]

BUDGET DEFICIT--The impact of lower oil exports resulting from the world oil surplus is beginning to show in the UAE, which now expects a 1982 budget deficit of Dirhams 4 billion (\$1.1 billion) instead of the Dirhams 2.3 billion (\$600 million) originally projected. The new calculation was based on oil income during the first half of this year and the deficit could widen further if oil exports continue to fall in the second half, a senior Finance Ministry official told the state-run Emirates news agency WAM. In March, the UAE announced a 1982 budget of Dirhams 22.6 billion (\$6.2 billion), representing a 15 per cent drop in expenditure compared with the previous year. The UAE, which gets about 94.5 per cent of its revenue from the export of oil and oil products, cut its oil production from 1.3 billion b/d to 1 million b/d last April under an OPEC production sharing agreement designed to impose a collective ceiling of 17.5 million b/d to defend the \$34 a barrel reference price. Premiums on UAE high-quality crudes were trimmed by about \$1 a barrel. UAE oil output stood at about 1.3 million b/d prior to the OPEC agreement, compared with a level of 1.5 million b/d for much of last year. [Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 26, 9 Aug 82 p 5]

FARM PRODUCTION BOOST--The UAE is planning to increase output of dairy produce and poultry as part of a scheme to reduce imports of food, the OPEC news agency reported from Abu Dhabi. The agency quoted a report from the UAE Ministry of Planning which pinpointed the development of agricultural projects in the Emirate of Ras al-Khaimah under the auspices of the Arab Organisation for Agricultural Development (OAAD) and aided by the federal government of the UAE. The report noted that an agricultural research centre had been established in the Digdaga region of the Emirate and that a number of livestock and poultry

projects were already under way there in accordance with an OAAD programme. It added that the fertile Al-Nakheel area of the Emirate must be considered as Ras Al-Khaimah's "agricultural nerve centre", producing a large variety of vegetables and other farm produce in sufficient quantities to meet not only the needs of the Emirate but also for sale to other Emirates. Ras al-Khaimah is likewise working to improve and increase its production of fruits with federal government assistance, OPECNA reported. The agency did not give further details. [Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 26, 9 Aug 82 p 5]

CSO: 4400/424

PRIME MINISTER DISCUSSES GOALS OF DEVELOPMENT PLAN

San'a' AL-THAWRAH in Arabic 13 May 82 pp 3-4

[Interview with Dr 'Abd al-Karim al-Iryani, prime minister of the YAR, by AL-THAWRAH; date and place not specified]

[Text] The development plan aspires to achieve a growth rate of 7 percent.

The Expatriates' Conference will be an honest attempt to acquaint [Yemeni expatriates] with the continual successes [achieved in Yemen] during the last few years.

The second 5-year plan was characterized by an increase in financing from [Yemen's] own resources and a decrease in the degree of financing from abroad.

When Arab citizens move around within the Arab world, this is interaction, not emigration.

The elements of Yemeni national unity are firmer and stronger than [the elements of national unity] in any other society.

We need to view things realistically and scientifically when talking about emigration.

Problems have been alleviated due to modernization of the judicial apparatus, but human relations always involve problems.

Our policy toward emigration is a wise, tidy, and conscious policy.

Emigration to the other Arab countries differs radically from emigration to the U.S. and to non-Arab countries.

Whoever says that emigration has destroyed agriculture in our country is deceiving himself because agriculture is more developed than it was before.

No doubt Yemeni citizens, as they view their country as well as the tireless efforts and concentrated activity engaged in by the country's leaders and government on various levels and in all realms, will inevitably ask what the short-range and long-range benefits, goals, and purposes are of these efforts and this activity, and they will want to know how these efforts and this activity are affecting the course of our development and advancement. Although everybody realizes these effects in terms of their material result, embodied by the great number of achievements and projects in the realm of services and development, nevertheless our citizens still feel a great need to hear as much as possible about the facts and to have them highlighted, especially by our high government officials. For this reason AL-THAWRAH went to see the person who, in his hands, holds most of the keys [concerning these matters] and conducted an extensive and comprehensive interview with Dr 'Abd al-Karim al-Iryani, the prime minister. One can call him "the authority;" he is the person people turn to for truthful answers. This was borne out by his all-encompassing interview, each reply during which could be considered tantamount to a complete report. The following is the text of the interview:

[Question] We all know that the 5-year plan is an ambitious plan which has addressed all the needs of our country in terms of services and development projects and that it has been allocated the sums necessary for a poor country such as ours. What benefits do you figure this plan will bring us if it proceeds as it is supposed to?

[Answer] Saying that the 5-year plan is an ambitious one is actually something which should be clearly defined. Why is it being called an ambitious plan? Will this plan fulfill all of the needs of Yemeni society during the next 5 years? Even though we might say that the plan has promised more than is required by this society, we still do not consider it to be an ambitious plan. The talk that has been going around concerning the plan being an ambitious one concerns the potential available to our country as a developing country which depends to a large degree on both regional and international cooperation to provide it with resources for development. When it is said that our plan is ambitious, this refers to our expectations concerning the amount of foreign aid [which we will be receiving] in order to carry out this plan. Some people feel that this is being ambitious. However, the plan will not fulfill all of the aspirations of Yemeni society, even if it were carried out totally, to the letter. The ambition [of the plan] is not a type of unsound ambition where we promise society that we will give it total prosperity. Quite the contrary, we are not promising that we will solve all of our country's social and economic problems during the next 5 years. The term "ambition" which was heard during the development conference concerned our expectations of receiving resources from abroad in order to carry out this plan. We are still very optimistic that these resources will come into the country in the volume that we decided upon [and requested]. Naturally, the goals of the plan are limited ones. We expect to achieve an annual average growth of up to 7 percent in order that there be a structural change in the Yemeni economy which will be oriented toward the elements of production and in order that there be expansion in public services and in our infrastructures. When this occurs, the plan will grow in accordance with the new status or situation in which our Yemeni society will be finding itself. This will be an advanced status in comparison to the situation which Yemen finds itself in right now, at the beginning of the current [new] 5-year plan. We are still optimistic that the objectives of this plan will be realized.

[Question] How is the plan being financed? I believe that you have already made some references to this matter. However, I would still like to ask this question. How is the plan being financed, and how can we be able to know what proposition of it is being financed by our own resources?

[Answer] Of course, if you review the documents of the plan, you will find that the sources of financing have been determined. Financing from foreign sources, which includes participation by Yemeni expatriates, will be constituting, I believe, about 45 percent. The rest, of course, will be financing from our own resources. This 45 percent figure is what aroused considerable discussion during the development conference because this figure was considered to be high. The fact is that any figure concerning the percentage of financing from abroad, whether it be 10 percent or 90 percent, is always a matter which arouses questions because it involves the country depending on financing from abroad. But there is no country in the world today which totally relies on itself, even if it is the richest country in the world. Bringing up the issue of dependence on the outside world to a given degree for development in our country is, in my view, something which is motivated by unrealistic philosophies. The world today is interlinked and intertwined, and even the richest of nations today are in need of the poorest of nations. What we should do is compare this figure of 45 percent in this plan to the percentage figure which we had in the previous plan. The previous plan called for about 66 percent financing from foreign sources. And thank God that I--in spite of the fact that I was one of those who was a major participant in the previous plan--was not optimistic that this percentage of [foreign] financing could be achieved. However, the figures have now come in, and it has turned out that the percentage of foreign financing which we anticipated in the previous plan was achieved to a very large degree when it came to implementation. To say that 45 percent of our financing will come from foreign sources is, in my view, not being too ambitious. Our experience during the previous plan was better than what we expected. In order to avoid depending on the outside world to the same degree which we depended on it during the previous plan, we have reduced the percentage of financing which we want from foreign sources and increased the percentage of financing which we want to provide from our own sources.

[Question] We have already heard that the first 5-year plan succeeded in completing all of our infrastructures. But then we were surprised to hear, when the new 5-year plan was being announced, that a large part of the new plan centers around infrastructures and development of human resources. How do you explain this?

[Answer] I do not believe that any particular official, or that anyone of us on any occasion, has said that the previous 5-year plan completed the building of our infrastructures. Such a statement, if made officially, would be a great distortion of the facts. On the contrary, I recall that all statements made by all officials said that the previous 5-year plan concentrated to a large degree on infrastructures. What we want during the next 5-year plan is to have the percentage of investment in infrastructures be less [than it was during the previous 5-year plan] so that we can utilize these resources for investing in aspects of production. But this does not mean that we will not be investing in the infrastructures. We are a backward society. Our country's geographical

situation is a very difficult and complicated one, and our country's communications network is not well developed. This situation will remain this way until we complete the infrastructures. This is why I maintain that the inclusion of many infrastructure projects in the current 5-year plan is exactly the right thing to do and is an urgent necessity. It has never been stated that Yemen has completed [all of] its infrastructure projects.

[Question] In your speech, in which you brought the Second International Yemen Development Conference to a conclusion, you stated that the government was ready to heed the remarks made at the conference. Could you please explain in some detail what these remarks were?

[Answer] The fact is that these remarks were both very good and very valuable. They related to what all of us know and are always talking about. Some of this is referred to in the plan. The remarks, first of all, concerned the volume of financing and said that it was ambitious with respect to our expectations of capital flowing in from abroad. Secondly, [the remarks said that] there was no doubt that implementation of the 5-year plan would require a high degree of administrative reform, flexibility in the application of methods or laws in order to ease the problems of investors, and fully writing out the laws which are still incomplete. To a great degree the focus was on modernization of the Yemeni administration in order that it be capable of responding to the aspirations of the second 5-year plan. We realize this and admit that we have a shortcoming in this respect. We have had a modern administration for only a very short time, and we still have only a limited number of trained and qualified personnel. We have promised to take these issues into consideration, we admit that we are readily aware of these shortcomings, and we admit that the modernization and organization of our administration, as well as solving as many of our administrative problems as possible, is one of the basic conditions for the success of the new 5-year plan.

[Question] Could you please talk to us about the foundations, roots, and most important formative elements of the Yemeni economy, and could you tell us what to expect in Yemen's future in this regard?

[Answer] Of course, we are always saying that our economy is an open economy which is based on the activity of two principal sectors which interact with each other in a positive and beneficial way. The private sector plays its basic role in various spheres of our country's economic activity such as the realms of agriculture, commerce, and industry. The public sector has the job of paving the way for this pioneering private sector and carries out certain projects in place of the private sector because the private sector in our country has not yet reached the stage where it can take on these projects. The general foundations of our economy are clear and stable. We believe that the future of Yemen's economy will be a prosperous one because it is an economy which is based on the participation of all elements in our society which are active and which are capable of participating in the economic and social development of our society. Our optimism is based on our land and our people, and these two things are the two basic pivots of development. And, thank God, we have good agricultural potential, and our agriculture is constantly growing and advancing. We believe that this sector will be one of the basic elements of development in our country. We also realize that it is the individual Yemeni which plays the

primary and basic role in this sector. Our country also has potential for tourism. There is no doubt that when the international community becomes acquainted with our country, this will provide an opportunity for this sector to grow, and [we believe] that this sector will be one of the important sectors in the future. In addition to this we have the sector of industry and we have available raw materials. We have begun to discover some raw materials and have begun to exploit others, such as cement. Also, there are raw materials available which are on the way toward being exploited and utilized. All of these things taken together lead any person who is making a critical examination [of our country] to feel optimistic that Yemen's future will be a prosperous one.

[Question] Our country has hosted a record number of local, pan-Arab, and international conferences. Could you please tell us what benefit, in your view, we are getting out of these conferences economically, culturally, and also politically speaking?

[Answer] There is no doubt that the conferences which are being held in our country are a distinct sign of the new age that our country is living in, under the leadership of President 'Ali 'Abdallah Salih. The fact that Arab nations and even some international institutions and organizations are sending representatives to our country and making it an important center for conferences is definite proof of the complete confidence which our country enjoys from the political and economic points of view and as far as both its bilateral and international relations are concerned. Economically speaking, there is certainly a great deal of benefit gained from these conferences in terms of stimulating the field of services related to the conferences. But, in my view, they are principally important because of political benefit and benefit gained through [exposure in] the informational media. We have always suffered from the fact that the outside world knows so little about us that what it writes about us very often is painful to all of us and even provokes us. It is quite noticeable that by opening up our country to the world, by holding these successive conferences, and by making it easier to come in and out of our country, we have given the outside world a true picture of ourselves. We are also noticing very clearly that the things that are being written about us in the world press have become more objective, more accurate, and express the real situation better. Perhaps some opinions are published which we do not agree with, but the amount of distortion and all the ignorant statements which do not apply to our situation are no longer so prevalent as was the case a few years ago. There is great value in political and informational media conferences. We believe that this is the best way to acquaint the outside world with our country. And we thank God that the success of these conferences and the very positive impressions which the participants in these conferences leave with have provided them with a positive, bright, and respectable impression and image of our country.

[Question] Many of our citizens are complaining about the negative features of some of our administrative and judicial bodies. They feel that there is a big difference between the slogans which we hear and what is actually done in practice. How can we arrive at a situation where there is a balance between these slogans and what is actually done in practice?

[Answer] First of all, human relations in any society, of course, have their negative and positive features, and there are always complaints. Some people sometimes, when they are discussing administrative and judicial problems, give the impression that we are moving toward a society like that of Plato's Republic. In my opinion, such people are victims of their unrealistic powers of imagination.

Let us look at the judicial problems which we have had in our country during the last 3 or 4 years, and let us look at the basic modernization which has taken place in the judicial apparatus. I can, in all certainty and with every degree of confidence, say that the problems which we have had have decreased to a very great degree as a result of the modernization of our judicial apparatus. But this does not mean that our problems are over. I say this for two reasons: First of all, such problems will not end because it is impossible for human relations not to involve problems. Secondly, the problems and complications which are a result of our past history cannot be solved overnight. After my 1 and ½ years of experience in government, I can say that the problems which we have had associated with the judiciary have decreased to a very great extent. The complaints which we inevitably hear always have two sides to them. Some of them are about an actual injustice and a mistake that has happened. Nobody is lax in his efforts to correct such injustices and mistakes. But in the case of a great many of the complaints, the person in need of something is blind and is only interested in fulfilling his own need. If he is told that the law or the system does not permit something or other, he believes that this is an infringement of the law. I do not deny that there are administrative and judicial problems. We cannot claim that all of our government bodies are perfect or that we have fully modernized them. We must always compare things to how they were when we first began, we must remember the methods we used to use when dealing with each other, and we must bear in mind how many fewer problems we have now than we did before. I can safely say that the situation in the judicial apparatus is more positive than it has been at any time in the past and that problems in the judiciary have greatly decreased as a result of the application of new judicial regulations and laws.

[Question] Soon the Second Yemeni Expatriates' Conference will be held. What are the objectives of expatriates' conferences? Will the Yemeni expatriates participate in the development plans? To what degree do you expect them to participate in the projects of the second 5-year plan?

[Answer] The Second Yemeni Expatriates' Conference is, of course, a sincere and serious attempt to involve the Yemeni expatriates in the affairs of their country and their land as well as to acquaint them with the success, development, and growth which has been taking place in their country during the last few years. We believe that these expatriates' conferences are extremely important because the expatriates should always remain aware of, and feel completely linked to, their country and their people. This conference is a part of this serious attempt to get the Yemeni expatriates involved with their nation.

According to statistics, the contribution of the Yemeni expatriates to the development [of Yemen], as far as the first 5-year plan was concerned, was, of course, a great and respectable contribution, and it was more than what we were expecting. Naturally Yemeni expatriates, as part of the private sector, contribute toward the process of development. The activity of the private sector, which is the sum total of the activity engaged in by residents inside the country as well as the expatriates, has been activity which has been highly beneficial and which gained the admiration and esteem of all of those who attended the Second International Development Conference. Furthermore, our expectations are that the facilities and availability of infrastructures and public services, which will serve as an incentive to Yemeni investors, whether they are residents or expatriates, will make this [investment] contribution more than it was in the previous 5-year plan. Yemeni expatriates are a very important and fundamental element in our country's economic and social development. They are a source of the hard currencies which provide the necessary goods and commodities for development and they are an immediate element of the economic development which our country is undergoing.

[Question] What is your opinion concerning the issue of emigration, as far as our country is concerned, and all the tragedies connected with it that people are talking about?

[Answer] The talk about emigration in our country is, of course, a constant subject of discussion and debate on this occasion when we are holding the expatriates' conference. No doubt it will once again lead to discussing the positive and negative features of emigration to places abroad.

The fact is that, first of all, we must recognize that the people of Yemen, ever since they have been known in history and not just since the twentieth century, have been a migrating people and a people always on the move. On one of the Greek islands a Himyaritic inscription was found in which a Yemeni merchant elegizes a Yemeni colleague of his who died on that island more than 2,000 years ago. The Yemeni people, by virtue of their country's climatic conditions, the composition of their land, and the geographical make-up of their country, have always been people who are on the move and it has been characteristic of them to live in other countries in order to supplement the elements of life which have been necessary for Yemeni society. We should always remember, first of all, that the Yemeni people are a people who migrate and live in foreign countries. In ancient times the spice and incense trade was trade carried on by Yemenis. History recognizes this fact. The Yemenis engaged in this commerce and travelled all over the ancient world which was known [to man] at that time. These commercial routes are well known and they are dotted everywhere with Himyaritic inscriptions--Yemeni inscriptions--which indicate the degree to which Yemenis interacted with their neighboring societies. So we must, first of all, accept as a basic fact that the Yemenis are a mobile people, characteristically live abroad, and are a people who have continually been involved with the outside world.

The latest emigration from our country, of course, is of a different type than emigration in the past. One cannot expect to see emigrants during the first century A.D. in the same light as one sees the emigrants in the twentieth century A.D. At the beginning of the present century only small numbers of people emigrated from our country. Most of these people went to Africa, Europe--Britain, in particular--and the U.S. No doubt there were at least tens of thousands of such emigrants. However, the number of such emigrants remained relatively limited due to the fact that the areas to which the people emigrated were distant and due to the fact that it was difficult to get to them. Naturally, there were positive benefits from the emigration of those Yemenis. There were families and generations of such emigrants which lived abroad. Some of these people would leave Yemen and then come back. Of course, during the cruel reign of the Imams, during the last 50 years under the rule of Imam Yahya and Imam Ahmad, the cruelty of the regime really was a motive for emigration abroad and not returning to Yemen. Such emigrants were afraid of the cruelty and terrorism which was the fate of Yemeni expatriates [who returned]. As I have already said, these expatriates were basically in countries outside the Arab world. Those Yemenis who went to Britain and to the U.S. really were confronted with all sorts of problems. Some of them suffered incredible tragedies. They went to live among people who had a different culture, a different language, a different religion, and different social relationships. They went to live among these societies and tried to create their own small societies in their midst. We know about many such people in Britain or in the U.S. In the case of some of them a generation would go by and they would be cut off from their homeland and they would be almost permanently lost to their families [in Yemen]. Some of them were compelled to marry people from the society where they lived and then lived there permanently.

The second generation of this group of emigrants to Europe and the U.S. became almost totally cut off from Yemeni society. Their language changed, their culture changed, and no doubt their degree of adherence to their religion also changed. Their fathers were very careful to adhere to the Islamic doctrine, but we cannot expect a young person who is born in Britain or the U.S. to grow up in that society without his culture and his orientation changing [from that of Yemeni Muslims]. This was a type of emigration in which the first generation really did keep its ties to Yemeni society, but the links of the second generation were weaker, and perhaps the third and fourth generations hardly had any attachment and ties to Yemeni society. The same was true in the case of the Lebanese. According to studies which have been made, the latest generations of Lebanese emigrants have far weaker ties to Lebanese society. This is a result of the fact that these Lebanese have lived in another society having another culture and different social relationships. This emigration which took place at the beginning of this century really did lead to the creation of another generation of people who were culturally and socially different from their fathers and grandfathers by virtue of the circumstances under which they were living and because they had no choice but to be a generation of people culturally and socially different. But with the advent of the fifties or the second half of this century economic opportunities began to be available in many neighboring areas, especially in the Arabian Peninsula and the Gulf area. This emigration which has been taking place, especially during the last 20 years, is radically different from the emigration to Europe and the U.S.

This is a matter being debated. However, there is no doubt that the Yemenis who have gone to live in [other areas of] the Arabian Peninsula and the Gulf area have gone to live in a society which, in fact, differs radically from the society which our fathers and brothers went to live in at the beginning of this century--which was European society and American society. Yemenis who emigrate to Kuwait or to the UAE are going to live in a Muslim society which has an Arab culture, Arab traditions, and Arab-Islamic [social] relationships. The degree to which they are affected by this society and the degree of social, economic, and cultural isolation which they suffer from is negligible in comparison with that which was undergone by Yemenis who emigrated to Europe and the U.S. Quite the contrary, people from among the fourth generation of Yemenis who have emigrated to Saudi Arabia can easily come to San'a' and not feel that they are in a nation which is strange to them--either in terms of language, culture, religion, or social relationships. There are people who are making studies of this new emigration from Yemeni society to the societies of our neighboring nations, and they are attempting to apply to this emigration the same criteria that have been applied to the emigration which took place to Europe or the U.S. This is a very false approach to the matter. One cannot consider migration within the Arab world to be emigration, even if it involves a person being forced to get a passport and sometimes to get a visa and residence permit. These are matters which are political and which have been imposed upon us and prescribed [by governments]. But the reality is that there is social, economic, and cultural interaction [among these Yemenis who go to other Arab countries and the people of those countries] within a single society, which is Arab society. I am not talking only about Yemenis, I am also talking, for example, about Egyptians. Today there are more than 1 million Egyptians living in Iraq. To what degree do Egyptians suffer from cultural, social, political, or intellectual isolation and change when they go to Baghdad? They do not suffer from any of this. There is only a small difference in dialect [between Egypt and Iraq]. Some scholars are studying this new emigration, which differs radically from the Yemeni emigration which took place in the past, and they are applying to it criteria which are false. Also, even scholars in the Arab world who are studying emigration [of Arabs] to the Gulf area and to parts of the Arabian Peninsula are attempting to apply to it the criteria of emigration to a society which is radically different in terms of culture, language, traditions, and [religious] doctrine. When Egyptians emigrate to the U.S., the final result of this is the creation of a generation [of Egyptians] who are totally cut off from Egyptian society. But we cannot apply the same criteria to the emigration of Egyptians to Baghdad, Kuwait, or the UAE because they retain their social, religious, and cultural ties. In fact, it is wrong to call this an "emigration." We must study this new phenomenon, the phenomenon of new interaction with the Arab world which has resulted from the existence newly available economic opportunities in areas which are in need of qualified and skilled personnel and are in need of a greater population. This phenomenon should be studied within the framework of culture, traditions, the Islamic religion, and the Arabic language. [Emigration to other Arab nations should] be studied in this framework rather than from the purely economic point of view. For example, one cannot compare the emigration of 20,000 Moroccans to the UAE with the emigration of 20,000 Moroccans to France. The social and cultural problems which Algerian and Moroccan emigrants suffer from today in France are problems

which really make one's hair stand on end. Sociologists in North Africa are constantly talking about them. When such scholars study the conditions of Moroccan expatriates in the UAE, Kuwait, or Saudi Arabia, it will be impossible for them to find [that Moroccan expatriates] are suffering from the same problems [as in France] which are the result of psychological disturbances and inability to adapt to the surrounding society. We need to take a realistic and scientific point of view, rather than an emotional or philosophical point of view, when we talk about the emigration [of Yemenis] which is currently taking place to areas outside of Yemen. This is the real element [that we should be concerned with]. Right now there are almost no Yemenis emigrating to Europe and the U.S. We should study, and approach from this point of view, the new social interaction in the Arab countries and the Gulf area in which Yemenis are playing an important role. We should not study this matter from the point of view that it is an emigration on a par with emigration by Yemenis to (Stifld) or New York. I call this [emigration by Yemenis to other Arab countries] "temporary residence abroad" rather than "emigration." Let us now take up a discussion of the benefits which have resulted from Yemeni emigration. These benefits have been embodied in statistics and figures. I do not need to justify my point of view. Some people are trying to say that the emigration has destroyed our agriculture. This is a fallacy which is as clear as the light of day. The fact is that our agricultural lands, on the contrary, are increasing in area. After digging new wells we now have 10 times the number of wells which we had 10 years ago. The agricultural terraced lands which we have are now being worked by large agricultural machinery more than in the past. The amount of agricultural land which we have in all of our provinces has not decreased at all. This is why we can say that there have been many positive benefits from this emigration. No doubt there have also been negative effects, including the rise in the wages of the labor force and the emigration of some skilled personnel who find employment opportunities outside Yemen. We do require a certain number of foreign workers and personnel, but they constitute a very small percentage when compared with the number of Yemenis who emigrate.

I am not saying that there are no negative effects to living abroad. Notice that we have begun to call it "living abroad" rather than "emigration." Everything in the world has both its positive and negative features. What we must do is to assess the positive and negative features in order to see what all the resulting benefits are which Yemeni society gets from this emigration. We maintain that our policy toward emigration is a wise, tidy, and conscious policy. If we closed the doors and prohibited all Yemenis from crossing the borders, we would be guilty of false pretenses because Yemenis must be allowed to be able to cross these borders. There is no nation [in the world today] which is able to totally prohibit its citizens from leaving to places outside its borders. For this reason, those Yemenis who go outside the country have the blessing of our political authorities, our political leaders, and our government, and they may go abroad with a feeling of reassurance. We do not consider that they are fleeing, that they are committing a crime, or that they are people who must be punished. If emigration were prohibited, Yemenis leaving the country might hesitate or be afraid to come back to their country and they would feel that they were like people who had fled the country. They would then try to get a passport from another nation, would arrange their affairs, and that would then mean that they had left and would never return. Right now we

are beginning to feel the advantages of our policy of allowing freedom of movement for all Yemeni citizens. I will give you an example of this. Ten years ago there were skilled craftsmen in automotive repair shops, carpentry shops, and other places where craftsmen plied their trade. I am sure that if you, 10 years ago, had asked anyone where he had learned this trade of his and where he had gotten his training, he would have said that he had been trained in Aden. Ten years ago, when the borders of North Yemen opened up and when North Yemen needed these skills, 90 percent of these skills and crafts which came to the country had been acquired in Aden during the time of the British occupation because South Yemen had undeniably undergone some degree of development and a certain degree of economic activity was taking place there which people living there had become trained to engage in. Today, however, when you go to automotive repair shops, small factories, and light industries of all sorts, you will find that the Yemenis running these establishments have acquired their skills in Riyadh, Kuwait, Dammam, or Tabuk. This is an actual fact, and you can verify it for yourself.

Supposing we had not allowed Yemenis to acquire these skills and experience? The generation of people who had been in Aden were, first of all, a generation of older people who had done their job and given what they had to offer. But God had led them to old age, they had retired, and they were no longer able to continue this job because there were too few of them and they were too old. But now we have begun to reap positive vocational benefits from our Yemeni emigrants. This is because they left with the blessing of our government and have returned to Yemen to work under the wing of a government which is looking out for them. Perhaps my answer to this question has become longer than it should have been. However, I am certain that the matter of holding the expatriates' conference is one which will be a subject of constant debate and discussion. I would like to say that this phenomenon should be studied with awareness and objectivity, and should not involve the intrusion of philosophical or political feelings or views or arbitrary hypotheses. There are new relationships which are being created in the Arab world, not only between us and our neighbors. They are new relationships and ties which are the result of new social and economic interaction within the framework of the Arab world. I consider that they will entail a positive end result which will serve to bring about Arab unity and Arab economic integration. We must study them from this point of view and not draw comparisons between them and the emigration of Egyptians to the U.S. or Yemenis to Britain. This is a different sort of phenomenon which has its own risks and its own disadvantages which we cannot ignore. But we should not equate the emigration and all-encompassing social movement which is taking place in the Arab world to emigration of persons [from Yemen] to Australia where they end up living in a society which they are not acquainted with and with which they cannot interact. The following generations [of Yemenis who go to Australia] come to have a different culture, a different language, and--unfortunately in the final analysis--perhaps a different religion.

[Question] What are your views concerning national unity? What are the means to consolidate and develop national unity? Could you give us some idea about the present status of efforts to achieve Yemeni unity? What are your views concerning the future of national unity as a result of the meeting at Ta'izz?

[Answer] There is no doubt that national unity is the foremost pillar for guaranteeing economic and social development, guaranteeing security and stability, and guaranteeing total harmony. We cannot have these things at all without national unity, nor can any other human society in the world. Without coherent national unity we cannot say that we have a harmonious and complete society. Thank God the basic elements of national unity in our country are extremely firm and solid. The reason for this is that, thank God, there are no religious differences in our society in the sense that there are different religious sects, as in some societies, which are the cause of social conflicts within these societies due to differences in religious doctrines. And also, for example, there are no ethnic differences. We are not a mixed society which is composed of two or three different ethnic groups. There are no sharp social and economic differences which would induce us to say that we are divided into widely differing social and economic classes. We are, thank God, still a society which has almost a unique degree of homogeneity. This is not true of many societies. In addition to this, our development has been carried out by our own people. We have not been forced to import a very large work force from societies which differ radically from our own and thus have not had to confront a situation involving social interaction between two completely different ethnic groups--a situation which leads to the necessity of taking certain measures. Thus, in my opinion, the formative elements of national unity which exist in our country are firmer and stronger than in any other society. All we have to do is maintain this complete harmony and social homogeneity which we enjoy today. There is no doubt that the economic and cultural changes which have taken place in our country have been a very great positive factor for guaranteeing our national unity. For example, I personally had never seen the city of San'a' before 1968. I did not know San'a' before then. However, the young people today are able to go to Sa'dah and then to Ta'izz within the course of a single day. Economic development really does constitute our society's basic infrastructure. The geographical situation of our country is also a very important factor when it comes to national unity. It has become one of the symbols of our national unity in our country today that the citizens have been able to transfer their social structure to Yemen's cities. Before the revolution, when you went to a city you found that 90 percent of those living in the city were [old] residents. If a new government official or merchant came to such a city, this was a matter of great astonishment and surprise for the people of that city. But people in Yemeni society today totally interact with each other, from one end of the country to another. Furthermore, they do so with a spirit of harmony and affection, and this has brought all sorts of benefits. This is why I am saying that national unity in our country, thank God, possesses the formative elements which enable us to be totally confident in Yemen's future and confident that Yemen will enjoy prosperity.

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YEMEN ARAB REPUBLIC

BRIEFS

TRIBAL REBELLION DENIED--ABU DHABI, July 5 (R)--North Yemen Monday denied reports which quoted diplomatic sources in Beirut as saying that a tribal rebellion had broken out against President Ali Abdullah Saleh. "The report is baseless and a figment of their imagination. The situation in the Yemen is peaceful," the North Yemen embassy in Abu Dhabi said in a statement. Diplomatic sources in Beirut were quoted as saying last week that the rebellion was launched June 26, by the Bakil tribe, the largest in the country. According to the sources, the trouble began when the president decided to dismiss some 2,000 army officers belonging to the Bakil tribe and replace them with men from the Sanhan tribe, to which the president himself belongs. [Text] [Jiddah ARAB NEWS in English 6 Jul 82 p 1]

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